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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who addresses jurisdictional policy must contend with the
fact-proclaimed at the outset of Professors Wright and Kane's Fed-
eral Courts treatise-that "there is to this day no consensus as to the
historical justification or the contemporary need for diversity jurisdic-
tion."' Even if one could discern the original objectives, they add,
t Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law. I served as Special Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
during its 2000-2003 work on amending Rule 23, and served as Associate Reporter to
the Federal Courts Study Committee in 1989-1990, when it produced recommenda-
tions on using minimal diversity jurisdiction to deal with dispersed litigation. Both
of these subjects are discussed in this paper, and in discussing them I am speaking
only for myself and not for either committee or anyone else. I am indebted to Mary
Kay Kane for reading an earlier draft of this paper and making many helpful com-
ments.
I CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 3 (6th ed.
2002).
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"[t]he conditions that existed, or were feared to exist, in 1789 are ir-
relevant in determining the continued necessity for diversity jurisdic-
tion. Thus, although one may fashion a general theory about the
appropriate use of the federal judicial power,3 one is also left with
strong competing currents. At least in Congress, those currents often
respond more to political pressure than to elegant general jurisdic-
tional policies.
Until recently, political currents have not often focused on proce-
dural issues, so jurisdictional policy has hardly occupied Congress. As
we are all aware, however, that has changed during the last two dec-
ades, and Congress has acted-and has given serious .consideration to
further acting-on procedural issues with some frequency.4  It is
hardly surprising that Congress might focus eventually on the class ac-
tion. A decade ago, for example, Judge Becker reported that " [i] n my
27 years on the bench, I have never seen an area in as much ferment
as this class action area is. ' Since then, the ferment surely has not
abated.
Identifying the stated jurisdictional policy of the Class Action Fair-
ness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 6 is not difficult. Congress said that the Act
was designed to redress overreaching by state courts handling multi-
state class actions, to ensure that these cases involving nationally im-
portant issues could be brought into federal court, and to provide
protections for class members.7 It is, of course, easy to denounce
these justifications for CAFA as window dressing, and to regard the
Act as a naked power grab. That is an understandable reaction, and
2 Id. at 145.
For an elegant general theory that offers a seven-factor method for evaluating
questions of jurisdictional allocation, see Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of
Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian
Chronicles, "78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1992).
4 See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining theJudi-
ciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (1996) (noting Congress's
increasingly active role with regard to procedure, beginning with its suspension of the
Rules of Evidence in 1973).
1 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., The Future of Class Actions in Mass Tort Cases: A Round-
table Discussion, 66 FORD. L. REv. 1657, 1667 (1998) (comments of Judge Edward R.
Becker).
6 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
7 See CAFA § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005) (setting forth statutory find-
ings and purposes).
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has been voiced by very reasonable observers. It is in keeping with
Professor Purcell's analysis of the uses of diversity jurisdiction during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 9 But that approach
leaves no room for considering jurisdictional policy on its own merits,
since it proceeds on a premise that there has been a "take no prison-
ers" legislative effort. Moreover, there is nothing inherently wrong
with justifying expansions of federal jurisdiction as a method for im-
proving results for a favored class of litigants.1 ° Whether or not the
proponents of CAFA should have been more candid about their moti-
vations, this paper treats the stated grounds for CAFA seriously.
The existence of "conspiracy" theories about CAFA is not surpris-
ing. Anyone who recently has worked on procedural reform knows
that even small changes often stir large passions and strong rhetoric."
The magnitude of the issues surrounding class actions was sufficiently
large that for a quarter century after amending the rule in 1966 the
For an example, see Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A
Better Way to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1521, 1522-
23 (2005), stating:
There is, of course, talk about fairer procedures in federal courts, about how
appropriate it is for national class actions to be in federal court before a single
judge, and about how it would be much more efficient to hear disparate class
actions that are filed in different states, but that involve very similar claims, in
one forum. But no one should be fooled by such talk. These proposals are
unabashed efforts at forum shopping because defendants believe they will im-
prove their chances of success markedly in class actions if they are in federal
courts. This conclusion is made clear by the fact that the impact of the re-
moval provisions on state court class actions would far exceed the rationales
offered for the amendments. Even when the vast overinclusiveness of these
removal provisions was pointed out, the bill's proponents did not back off or
agree to narrowing amendments.
In somewhat the same vein, Professor Burbank says that "any sentient reader of the
statute's statement of findings and purposes" would recognize that "[t] hey are, at best,
window dressing. Less charitably, they meet the philosopher Harry Frankfurt's defini-
tion of 'bullshit,' because they are made with apparent indifference to their truth con-
tent." Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
9 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DivERsiTY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 ch. 2 (1992) (describing the mani-
fold ways in which corporate defendants used access to federal court as a method of
defeating or frustrating plaintiffs' claims against them).
10 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1730 (1991) (arguing in favor of passage of the
Violence Against Women Act, in part to ensure access to federal court for such claims).
nI have in mind in part my experience since 1996 as Special Reporter of the Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules. In this paper, I speak only on my own behalf and not
on behalf of that Committee or anyone else.
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Advisory Committee on Civil Rules "stayed on the sidelines because of
a self-imposed moratorium on Rule 23 revisions." 12  In 1996, the
Committee put out for comment a preliminary draft of possible revi-
sions of the standards for certifying class actions, and a cascade of
strong public commentary followed.1 3 In 2003, the rule was amended
to refine and strengthen the judicial handling of class actions-not to
alter the standards for certifying a class action-and very substantial
controversy nonetheless attended these developments. If CAFA is
"the most significant change in class action practice" since the 1966
amendment of Rule 23,14 it was unavoidable that it would incite
heated controversy.
Combining the absence of a clear contemporary policy for diver-
sity jurisdiction with the enormous controversy about the contempo-
rary class action therefore presents one evaluating the jurisdictional
policy of CAFA with a challenge. I propose to approach that topic by
looking, first, at whether class action jurisdictional doctrine before
CAFA protected important jurisdictional policies, and then consider-
ing how class action theory might inform those jurisdictional issues. I
then will turn to the unique importance attached to subject matter ju-
risdiction, and the potential implications of that treatment for the
thorny issues that CAFA requires a court to resolve in determining
whether it has jurisdiction.
Focusing on the stated objectives of CAFA itself, it seems to me
that most concede that there were valid arguments for using diversity
jurisdiction in at least some class actions that could not have been in
federal court before the Act was adopted, although one can certainly
contend that the problems were not as great as urged and that CAFA's
solution was overbroad. Accepting that CAFA furthers some legiti-
mate jurisdictional policies, I will then turn to some possible implica-
12 John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?, 24
MIss. C. L. REv. 323, 347 (2005). Rabiej goes on to describe the Judicial Conference's
instruction in 1991 that the "committee... review Rule 23 with a view to amending it
to accommodate the demands of asbestos mass-tort litigation." Id.
1 See generally REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE
WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEFJUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO
THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1999) (compiling a variety of mate-
rials on related topics); Working Papers of the Advisory Committee On Civil Rules on
Proposed Amendments to Civil Rule 23 (May 1, 1997) (unpublished, on file with the
author) (compiling, in four volumes of roughly 800 pages each, commentary on the
1996 preliminary draft of possible amendments to Rule 23).
14 Edward F. Sherman, Class Action Fairness Act and the Federalization of Class Actions,
238 F.R.D. 504, 504 (2007).
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tions of this use of jurisdiction that have been urged by others: the
withering of the Erie restraint on substantive lawmaking by federal
judges in diversity cases, and the possible relaxation of the Klaxon re-
quirement that federal judges follow the choice of law principles of
the states in which they sit. Finally, I will caution that even if Erie and
Klaxon are outwardly respected after CAFA, there is a possibility that
federal judges in CAFA cases may take what Judge Easterbrook fa-
mously called the "central planner" attitude of preferring settlements
that offer a national solution for all class members. 15 Whether or not
those results could be regarded as flowing from jurisdictional policy,
they seem worthy of attention as possible consequences of this change
in jurisdiction.
What remains after one moves beyond strident statements, then, is
a rather modest reorientation of jurisdictional policy that seems con-
sistent with what might be called the "liberal" orientation of thirty
years ago but that is now adopted at the behest of business interests.
This is surely not the first time that such ironic turns have occurred in
federal procedural legislation,1 6 but it suggests that today's prefer-
ences may also be transitory. There is no particular reason to assume
the enduring attractiveness for business interests of federal courts',
compared to state courts', views on class certification and related mat-
ters, 17 so one possible result of CAFA's jurisdictional policy could be to
empower future federal courts to become more creative in favor of
class action treatment than they have been in the past. That impulse
might be furthered by the congressional acknowledgement in CAFA
that class actions are a valuable technique for aggregating claims. By
the 1980s and 1990s, consternation about the 1966 expansion of class
actions shifted markedly as defendants learned how to use class ac-
15 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. de-
nied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). For a pertinent invocation of this phrase at the outset on a
topic I will examine later, see infra text accompanying notes 246-262; see also Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353,
1355 (2006).
16 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 969 (1987) (describing
successful submission of the Rules Enabling Act-long pushed by conservatives in
Congress-as New Deal legislation).
17 As Professor Burbank points out, lawyers in Texas may find federal courts more
receptive to class certification than state courts. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. RE,. 1439,
1458 n.71 (2008).
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tions to accomplish the goals they wanted to achieve."' So also, a quar-
ter century from now, many may look back at CAFA as enabling legis-
lation that furthered the goal of consumer class actions rather than
the interests of the business establishment that pressed for its passage.
I. PRE-CAFAJURiSDICTIONAL DOCTRINE:
SOMETHING WORTH PRESERVING?
Because CAFA changed existing jurisdictional doctrine, it seems
useful to start with that doctrine. Although application could be diffi-
cult, the rules were clear enough. But that hardly means that they
made sense; probably few would endorse them as an original matter,
even though they may have been comfortable because they were fa-
miliar until CAFA changed them.
On the complete diversity prong, the Supreme Court's 1921 deci-
sion in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble held that only the citizenship
of the named plaintiffs needed to be considered in determining
20whether the complete diversity requirement was satisfied. It reached
this conclusion by analogizing the class action to a creditors' bill and
invoking an 1885 decision in which it held that there was jurisdiction
to permit intervention by nondiverse parties after the suit was initiated
by diverse parties.2 1 But this form of ancillary jurisdiction seemed to
weaken the complete diversity requirement, since one could arrange
to have the diverse parties sue first and then add the others later.
Similarly, in a class action, a lawyer could initially name only diverse
class members and use the class device to broaden the case to include
the nondiverse ones.
18 See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Pro-
gress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 789 (1993) (footnotes omitted), stating:
1960s enthusiasm for using the class action as a method of banding claimants
together has given way to 1980s and 1990s uneasiness that use of the device
will trammel the rights of plaintiffs and permit defendants to steal a march on
plaintiffs' individual control of their litigation destinies. Although the 1966
perspective might have been that a number of "establishment defendants"
would blanch at the increased availability of class actions, the perspective a
quarter century later is not so one-sided. Some defendants may view class ac-
tions as an important tool to deal with widespread liability.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 109-110.
20 255 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1921).
21 Id. at 365 (relying on Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885)). In Stewart, the
Court held that once there was jurisdiction as between the original plaintiffs and de-
fendants, "the court, in exercising jurisdiction between the parties, could incidentally
decree in favor of all other creditors coming in under the bill." 115 U.S. at 64.
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The intervention route was closed by the Supplemental Jurisdic-
tion Act in 1990,22 but the class action wrinkle was not mentioned in
that statute, leading to the Supreme Court's 2005 holding in Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. that, at least as to amount in con-
troversy (discussed below), supplemental jurisdiction exists for claims
of class members that do not satisfy the jurisdictional minimum so
long as the proposed class representative can satisfy the jurisdictional
minimum.23 Perhaps having in mind the "potentially gaping hole inthecopltedierit " ,,24 ti
the complete diversity requirement that this reading could create
with regard to Rule 20joinder of additional plaintiffs, 2 5 the Court was
quick to emphasize that the complete diversity requirement was not
necessarily eroded by its relaxation of the jurisdictional-amount re-
quirement:
The complete diversity requirement is not mandated by the Constitution
or by the plain text of § 1332(a). The Court, nonetheless, has adhered
to the complete diversity rule in light of the purpose of the diversity re-
quirement, which is to provide a federal forum for important disputes
where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state
litigants. The presence of parties from the same State on both sides of a
case dispels this concern, eliminating a principal reason for conferring
§ 1332 jurisdiction over any of the claims in the action.... Incomplete
diversity destroys original jurisdiction with respect to all claims, so there
is nothing to which supplemental jurisdiction can adhere. 6
The lower courts have read this admonition as justifying contin-
ued adherence to the complete diversity requirement, in Rule 19 and
Rule 20 situations, thereby closing the discrepancy about which Justice
21Ginsburg was concerned.
22 SeeJudicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 310(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089, 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (b) (2000)) (forbidding supplemental jurisdic-
tion over claims by parties who intervene in diversity cases under Rule 24).
23 545 U.S. 546, 558-59 (2005).
24 Thomas D. Rowe,Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M. Mengler, Compounding
or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY
L.J. 943, 961 n.91 (1991).
2 See Exxon, 545 U.S. at 589 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the impact
of the majority's analysis on Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., the companion case to
Exxon involving a Rule 20joinder situation).
26 Id. at 553-54 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
27 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 179 (2d
Cir. 2007) ("Exxon makes clear that its expansive interpretation of § 1367 does not ex-
tend to additional parties whose presence defeats diversity."); General Refractories Co.
v. First State Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that if a nonparty was
"indispensable" tinder Rule 19(b) but was not diverse, the action should be dismissed);
see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 351 (2006) (stating that Exxon
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But what of Rule 23? Under Ben-Hur, that rule seems to permit a
suit to be in federal court even though there are plaintiff class mem-
bers-indeed, the vast majority of class members-who have the same
citizenship as the defendant. Maybe the answer is that this coinci-
dence of citizenship is less obvious in a class action, although that
might not be true in Rule 20 situations with large numbers of plain-
tiffs. Perhaps a better answer is that, despite the Court's repeated
admonition about its objective, the complete diversity requirement
never really served that purpose.2s The point for our purposes is that
the existing treatment of the complete diversity requirement in class
actions left a good deal to be desired before Exxon and still presented
challenges (aside from CAFA) after that decision. Under Ben-Hur, of
course, the requirement became entirely elective whenever one diverse
class member could be the named class representative and another
member was nondiverse. It is hard to believe, however, that giving
plaintiffs' lawyers the election in class actions absolutely to control the
existence of diversity was thejurisdictional policy embraced in Ben-Hur.
Things were not that much better on the amount-in-controversy
prong. Before 1966, the rule had not permitted aggregation of class
members' claims unless they were 'joint," which would lead to treating
the case as a "true" class action under original Rule 23. Perhaps that
29classification scheme sometimes posed no problems, but often it did.
Certainly the 1966 amendments abandoned it, substituting a func-
allows "a federal court in a diversity action to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
additional diverse plaintiffs whose claims failed to meet the amount-in-controversy
threshold" (emphasis added)).
28 Recall Judge Henry Friendly's early criticism of the complete diversity
requirement:
[W]ho can say whether a Vermont jury, concentrating attention on the one
Vermont defendant, would shut its eyes to the merits of the complainants' case,
or, realizing that its fellow citizen was only one of a crowd, would deal fairly and
squarely with all? A theory so little founded on realities could hardly be ex-
pected to furnish a satisfactory answer to a new and difficult question.
Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 509
(1928).
29 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEEJR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuITY 200, 257 (1950) (stating
that the author had as much difficulty distinguishing a "common" from a "several"
right as in deciding whether some ties were green or blue, and adding that "[t]he
situation is so tangled and bewildering that I sometimes wonder whether the world
would be any the worse off if the class-suit device had been left buried in the learned
obscurity of Calvert on Parties to Suits in Equity").
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tional scheme. But even though the Court recognized this change 3 0 it
held in Snyder v. Harris that the claims of all the class members could
not be combined to satisfy the jurisdictional minimum. Soon there-
after it added, in Zahn v. International Paper Co., that pendent or ancil-
lary jurisdiction could not be used to add the claims of class members
that were too small even though the class representative satisfied the
32jurisdictional minimum. Exxon, of course, holds that the Supple-
mental Jurisdiction Act overturned Zahn, but left Snyder undisturbed.
It could certainly have been different. In dissent in Snyder, Justice
Fortas (joined by Justice Douglas) denounced the majority's refusal to
give jurisdictional effect to the recasting of Rule 23. Shortly after the
decision in Snyder, Professor Kaplan, the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee in drafting the 1966 revisions to Rule 23, said that "It]he
net effect of the decision is to disfavor the small fellow and thereby to
defeat a main purpose of the Rule revision. 34  In 1976, Professor
Goldberg drove home a similar point in criticizing these amount-in-
controversy decisions:
If there is an established federal interest in hearing all "substantial" con-
troversies between citizens of different states and leaving more minor
disputes to state courts, then a procedural change enlarging the resjudi-
cata effect of a class action may increase the substantialness of the lawsuit
and hence the federal interest in entertaining it.,3
30 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969) (recognizing that "[t]he 1966
amendment to Rule 23 replaced the old categories with a functional approach to class
actions").
Id. at 338.
32 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973).
43 See 394 U.S. at 348 (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("There is certainly no reason the spe-
cific application of this body of federal decisional law to class actions should be im-
mune from reevaluation after a fundamental change in the structure of federal class
actions has made its continuing application wholly anomalous."); see also Redish, supra
note 3, at 1808 (arguing that the majority's conclusions in Snyder that the pre-1966
rules were not difficult to apply and that the change in the rules was insufficient to
warrant a change in jurisdictional doctrine were "simply wrong").
There was certainly a counterargument to this position, based in part on Rule 82
and also on the limits of the rulemakers' power to affect jurisdiction by rule provision.
For arguments on why those limitations do not affect the relevance of the 1966 amend-
ments to the question presented in Snyder, see id. at 1809, which asserts that "[t]he
Court's reasoning in Snyder effectively shields the judicial decision not to alter purely
judge-made aggregation rules behind a wall of legislative inertia."
34 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 498
(1969).
35 Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jwisdiction, 28
STAN. L. REv. 397, 459 (1976) (footnote omitted).
1773
1774 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1765
Moreover, as also is emphasized in the contemporary academic
literature, the treatment of the amount-in-controversy requirement in
class actions seemed incompatible with the treatment of the complete
diversity requirement.36 Snyder and Zahn could be (and were) viewed
as symptoms of a more general souring in the 1970s of the federal
courts' attitudes toward class action practice under amended Rule 23.
At that time, the prevailing academic view was that federal courts
were more attractive to plaintiffs, as epitomized by Professor Neub-
orne's seminal 1977 article on the myth of parity between federal and
38state courts. Since then, we have become more cautious about this
notion. Professor Purcell's thorough work has taught us that, from
the mid-nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, plaintiffs
usually feared and avoided federal courts, while corporate defendants
preferred them, 39 and more recently, defendants have come to prefer
federal courts for class actions in particular.4 Others have concluded
41that parity is impossible to measure.
Whatever the academic view, the practicing plaintiffs' bar's atti-
tude is clear. Consider the vigorous antipathy toward federal courtju-
risdiction recently displayed in Trial magazine:
36 See David P. Currie, Pendent Parties, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 753, 762-63 (1978) (noting
that "[i]t is when interests are several that an out-of-state party is most likely to need
the jurisdiction provided by Ben-Hur to protect him from bias in the local court; when
interests are joint, a biased tribunal may be unable to injure the outsider without
harming a local coparty as well").
37 See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality,
and the "Class Action Problem, " 92 HARv. L. REV. 664, 679-80 (1979) (discussing the
"shock waves" sent by the "restrictive decisions" in Snyder and Zahn).
38 Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1977) (criticiz-
ing the view of "parity" between federal and state courts, under which state courts
could be trusted to provide sufficient protection for federal rights).
39 See PURCELL, supra note 9, ch. 2 (detailing the various ways in which corporate
defendants benefited from having cases in federal court). It is worth noting that most
of those advantages seem inapplicable in modem class actions affected by CAFA. The
inconvenient location of federal courts in large cities, for example, is unlikely to deter
modern class action plaintiffs' lawyers.
40 See Morrison, supra note 8, at 1526 ("By the mid-1990s, defendants in class ac-
tions began to favor federal courts, just as plaintiffs once did. Conversely, many plain-
tiffs' lawyers began to prefer state courts." (footnote omitted)).
41 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary,
36 UCLA L. REv. 233, 235-36 (1988) (emphasizing that questions of parity or inequal-
ity between the federal and state courts depend on empirical judgments for which
there is no empirical measure); see also Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice,
and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36
UCLA L. REv. 329, 330-31 (1988) (arguing that institutional factors such as caseload,
support staff, and lifetime appointments mean that the federal courts are preferable).
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Plaintiff attorneys' preference for state courts is undisputed and
understandable. Reasons for avoiding federal court range from the
mundane (greater familiarity with state procedure) to the strategic
(greater likelihood of securingjustice for clients).
In most cases, local judges are elected by the very people whose dis-
putes they will hear, motivating speedy and fair adjudication. Federal
judges are appointed for life, and their courts are clogged with criminal
cases. The so-called war on drugs has so overburdened the federal judi-
ciary that getting a civil case tried at all in many federal courts is nearly
impossible.
To reduce their burgeoning dockets, federal courts have increasingly
engaged in stringent control of discovery, aggressive encouragement of
settlement, and more frequent granting of summaryjudgment. As a re-
suit, litigation in federal court is more expensive and time-
consuming.... Finally, but significantly, lawsuits in federal court are in-
creasingly being consolidated into multidistrict, pretrial litigation pro-
42
ceedings, where they often languish for years.
As within the bar, academic winds have shifted somewhat, and op-
position to CAFA partly reflects the shift toward recognition of the
enduring reality of attitudes like those portrayed by Professor Purcell.
All of this bears on the controversy attending CAFA: guarding the
ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to avoid federal court has achieved salience
that would probably have surprised academics analyzing these prob-
lems in the 1970s.
The point is that Snyder could easily have turned out differently,
with obvious implications for Zahn. Consider how different things
would have been for the issues raised by CAFA had that occurred:
Thejurisdictional minimum would not have posed a significant obsta-
cle to federal court jurisdiction for most state law class actions for
money, and under Ben-Hur, plaintiffs' lawyers would have had almost
complete discretion to decide whether their cases should qualify for
federal jurisdiction by choosing the class representative carefully. The
whole notion that consumer class actions were somehow "reserved"
for state court determination would have been much more difficult to
maintain. But the clash in treatment of the diversity and jurisdic-
42 Erik B. Walker, Keep Your Case in State Court, TRIAL, Sept. 2004, at 22, 22 (foot-
note omitted).
An additional factor prompting many plaintiffs' lawyers to prefer state court is the
federal courts' "gatekeeper" function under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993). For example, another article in Trial magazine says that Daubert
"has had a devastating effect on civil plaintiffs," and "has made trying cases in federal
court a riskier... enterprise than at any time in the last 50 years." Ned Miltenberg, Out
of the Fire and into the FryeingJPan or Back to the Future, TRIAL, March 2001, at 18, 19-20.
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tional-amount issues seems too much to ignore. In sum, there is little
to favor the pre-CAFA jurisdictional treatment of class actions except
that it was already there.
II. INVOKING CLASS ACTION THEORY
A generation ago, Professor Chayes remarked that he found it
"unlikely that the class action will ever be taught to behave in accor-
dance with the precepts of the traditional model of adjudication."43 A
few years later, he suggested that the class can "be seen as a single ju-
ral entity capable of suing and being sued, not unlike the more famil-
iar organizational litigants-corporations, unions, [and] government
departments. 44  Perhaps the handling of jurisdictional issues would
work better with a comprehensive theory of the class action. At least
two efforts have emerged since Professor Chayes wrote.
A decade ago, Professor Shapiro followed up Professor Chayes's
lead and argued that the class should be regarded as the party.4" Pro-
fessor Shapiro saw a choice between an "aggregation" model and an
"entity" model. 46 He also likened the entity model to "a whole range
of voluntary private associations-congregations, trade unions, joint
stock companies, corporations"-noting, however, that not all "volun-
tary associations" are entirely voluntary.'7 Even in the mass tort situa-
tion, then, he argued that the entity approach would be preferable.48
He pursued the analysis through a variety of issues, such as the attor-
ney-client relationship, and urged that class members should be given
a method for influencing the handling of the case. . Although Pro-
43 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281, 1291 (1976).
44 Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 nerm-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28 (1982).
45 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 913, 919 (1998) (advocating the "entity" view of the class action in which the
class, rather than any particular individual, is the lawyer's client). Professor Shapiro
noted the parallels between his views and Professor Chayes's work. Id. at 918 n.7.
46 He found inspiration for the latter in Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to
the RulemakingProcess, 71 N.Y.U. L. RENT. 13 (1996). Shapiro, supra note 45, at 917 n.6.
47 Shapiro, supra note 45, at 921 (citing trade unions, congregations, and munici-
pal governmental entities as "voluntary" organizations in which members may have
limited say in their litigation activities).
48 Id. at 927-34.
49 See id. at 939 (arguing that "if the class is seen as the litigating entity, then it
should be regarded not only as the party plaintiff but as the client"). On this score,
consider FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4), which directs that "[c]lass counsel must fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class."
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fessor Shapiro's analysis was not focused on jurisdictional issues, it
may offer a way of approaching them.
Such an approach could begin with the history of the class action.
The distant background for the modern class action, as Professor
Yeazell tells us, was the medieval group action, which was brought on
behalf of a group that actually existed in society, somewhat like the
organizational litigants mentioned by Professor Shapiro. ° Although
the "true" class actions of original Rule 23 may have slightly echoed
this concept, the functional 1966 rewriting of the rule does not readily
lend itself to a theory of the class as some sort of independent entity.
This does not mean, however, that a class recognized by a court might
not become a functioning social entity as well, perhaps even permit-
ting precisely the sorts of control that Professor Shapiro favored for
S 51
the class action. Consider, for example, the following description of
a group of neighbors who banded together in nonclass litigation to
make claims for exposure to toxic waste dumped near their homes:
Despite their lack of common ailments or history, they still had to devise
a way to speak with one voice. So they wrote a full constitution, com-
plete with checks and balances. The charter is divided into six articles-
only one fewer than the U.S. Constitution. Article II delimits the powers
of the Steering Committee and enumerates the duties of the Business,
Property, Health and Guardian ad Litem subcommittees. There are
definitions of a quorum, methods for the conduct of business, and by-
laws regarding the election of officers. Article VI details the proceedings
for impeachment.
t0 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION ch. 2 & 3 (1987) (describing the medieval origins of suits on behalf, for
example, of the residents of a given village).
For his discussion of the topic, see Shapiro, supra note 45, at 940:
This approach does not imply that class members should be deprived of a
significant role in litigation brought on behalf of the class. Even if the class is
the relevant litigating entity, it is not one that can act, think, or communicate
on its own. In the case of a trade union or corporation, there are preexisting
individuals who have been authorized to speak for the entity and who nor-
meally would be the ones to work with counsel. In the case of a class that is, in
effect, created for purposes of a particular litigation, there is likely to be no
preexisting structure, and methods should be devised for creating that struc-
ture and endowing it with the widest representation consistent with efficient
case management.
52 Jack Hitt, Toxic Dreams: A California Town Finds Meaning in an Acid Pit, HARPER'S
MAG.,July, 1995, at 57, 61. For a discussion of the efforts needed to resolve intraclass
disputes in an employment class action combining claims of racial and gender dis-
crimination, see Shauna I. Marshall, Class Actions as Instrnments of Change: Reflections on
Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 911, 915-25 (1995), who
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One can surely challenge Professor Shapiro's ideas by stressing
the reality that class actions are usually constructs approved (indeed,
created) by the court's certification order. Certainly the Rule
23(b)(3) common-question class action does not intrinsically have
many characteristics that correspond to existing social institutions.
Yet the recent amendment to Rule 23, providing that class counsel
owes a primary duty to the class as a whole, is consistent with this no-
tion of the class as a discrete interest.53 Consider the relevance of this
approach to jurisdictional questions; certainly the entity theory would
lead to a different result in Snyder, for it is difficult to doubt that the
claims of the entire entity are before the court. A corporation's claim
or a labor union's claim would also be treated in this manner.
But could Ben-Hur survive this analysis? In regard to partner-
ships,54 labor unions ,55 and even limited partnerships, 6 the Court has
held that the citizenship of each member of these voluntary associa-
tions must be considered in determining whether complete diversity
exists. The entity theory, then, seems to preclude diversity jurisdiction
whenever there is a single nondiverse class member. But, as Profes-
sors Wright and Kane note, the class action rule "would be totally un-
workable in a diversity case if the citizenship of all members of the
class, many of them unknown, had to be considered."
57
The only analogy that is consistent with the treatment accorded to
class actions in Ben-Hur is the handling of the corporation. This
treatment, of course, flows directly from the diversity statute. Given
describes her experiences meeting with class members to discuss and work through
differences.
53 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g) (4) (requiring that class counsel "fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class").
See, e.g., Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889) (holding that citizenship
of "mere partnership" must be determined by the citizenship of its members).
55 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 152-53
(1965) (holding that an unincorporated labor union is not a citizen for purposes of
diversityjurisdiction).
56 See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1990) (holding that a lim-
ited partnership is not a citizen of its home state for purposes of diversityjurisdiction).
57 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 1, at 524 (footnote omitted). As discussed below,
however, a similar sort of analysis may be necessary to apply the exceptions to CAFA
jurisdiction for cases in which a set percentage of class members are local. See infra text
accompanying notes 87-108 (providing examples of suits that illustrate the difficulty of
applying CAFA's exceptions, which depend on showing that percentages of class mem-
bers are citizens of the forum state).
58 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1) (2000) (providing that, for purposes of diversity, "a
corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorpo-
rated and of the State where it has its principal place of business").
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the customary argument for diversity jurisdiction (protecting outsiders
against prejudice), Professor Burbank notes that CAFA "shines a spot-
light on the manifest absurdity of continuing to treat a corporation
engaged in national commerce (and likely to have a national or inter-
national shareholder base) as if it were an outsider in forty-eight out
of fifty states." 9 Indeed, a corporation might even contrive to incor-
porate or locate its headquarters in a given state in order to affect its
access to federal court under that statute.
Ben-Hur, without even the benefit of a statute, permits this litiga-
five "entity" to obtain or avoid access to federal court based entirely on
the counsel's choice as to which class member is named the class rep-
resentative. Even if only one class member shared citizenship with the
defendant, then counsel could preclude federal court jurisdiction by
naming that class member as the representative. Similarly, if only one
class member were diverse, counsel desiring access to federal court
could ensure diversity by naming only that class member as the repre-
sentative. Even corporations cannot readily make their choices about
where to incorporate or locate their principal places of business en-
tirely to permit or prevent access to federal court for specific cases.60
An entity theory would seem to invite the courts to develop some con-
straint on counsel to preclude this sort of activity. 6' At a minimum,
the entity theory appears to confine federal court jurisdiction for class
actions very strictly.
62
59 Burbank, supra note 8, at 1941-42. For further development of this point, see
Burbank, supra note 17, at 1465, who examines the treatment of corporations for pur-
poses of diversity and claims that it was a "blunder[]" in 1844 that first gave them ac-
cess to federal court on this ground.
60 But see Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1928) (describing a situation in which a corpora-
tion did reincorporate in another state to create diversity and thereby make a contract
enforceable under the "general" common law available in federal court, even though it
was illegal under state law).
61 As a practical matter, however, such a theory might be only partially effective
exactly because the class is "assembled" solely for purposes of litigation. Sometimes
there may be an argument that a class definition is underinclusive, but often plaintiffs'
counsel can simply leave out those potential class members whose involvement would
prove inconvenient, such as the nondiverse ones.
62 Of course, one could try to solve this problem by defining a class to exclude citi-
zens of the states of which defendant was a citizen. But that sort of misshapen class
underscores the artificiality of this contrivance to obtain federal courtjurisdiction, and
might even be difficult to justify at the class certification stage. Certainly, one could
not meaningfully defend an entity view of the class at the same time as one excluded
those who would seem clearly to be part of the entity.
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If Professor Shapiro's approach would unduly constrict federal ju-
risdiction in class actions, the other major effort at class action the-
ory-largely focused on jurisdictional issues-might unduly empower
plaintiffs' counsel to control it. A quarter century ago, then-Professor
Hutchinson analyzed the Supreme Court's failure to choose between
a 'joinder" and a "representational" characterization for class ac-
tions. 63 The joinder model, she explained, "focus [es] on each indi-
vidual member of the class.",64  The representation model, on the
other hand, focuses only on the named representative before the
court.65 Drawing in part on the analogy of unions that represent their
members, Professor Hutchinson urged that Rule 23 and the ability of
class members to challenge adequacy of representation in collateral
litigation "legitimize representation [as the model] for the modern
class action.""" Invoking also the history of the class action,6 7 she con-
cluded, by contrast, that "[a] serious adoption of the joinder approach
would take the Court back even further than the original Rule 23." 68
The net effect of Professor Hutchinson's analysis would be that
plaintiffs' counsel could control whether the diversity prong was satis-
fied and that, given the current $75,000 jurisdictional minimum, they
would very frequently be able to ensure that it was not. But they could
not so regularly ensure that the jurisdictional minimum would be satis-
fied, since often the sorts of claims asserted in consumer class actions
could not conceivably warrant such an individual recovery. Put differ-
ently, in her view things should be exactly as they would have been af-
ter the Exxon decision had CAFA not been enacted.
63 See Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?,
1983 SuP. CT. REv. 459, 459 (lamenting that "the Court has shown no awareness of the
choices it has been making").
64 Id. at 482.
65 Id. at 497.
6 Id. at 499. It is worth noting that the ability of class members to collaterally at-
tack the adequacy of representation is disputed. Compare Patrick Woolley, The Avail-
ability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REv. 383,
388 (2000) (arguing that due process requires that there always be a right for such an
attack), with Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State
Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 272-80
(arguing that where a proper adequacy-of-representation inquiry is made in a class ac-
tion and class members have an opportunity to object, there should be no right to at-
tack adequacy collaterally as well).
67 See Hutchinson, supra note 63, at 504 ("The history of the class action, in the
end, provides significantly greater support for the representation model than the al-
ternative, even though the nature of the action has changed dramatically over time.").
68 Id. at 506.
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In sum, at least these two major theoretical efforts to refine a con-
cept of the class action do not seem to solve thejurisdictional problem
that CAFA addressed. If so, that means that neither existing doctrine
nor theoretical possibilities necessarily are preferable to the CAFA ap-
proach. Whether Congress had some theory of class actions in mind
when it passed CAFA is unclear. It seems that Congress regarded the
class action largely as a device used by lawyers to magnify the impor-
tance of their suits. That attitude is consistent with one that the Su-
preme Court has sometimes adopted regarding class actions,69 al-
though it seems a stretch to say that the Court has articulated an
overarching theory.
III. THE POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF THE UNIQUENESS OF
JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
Before turning to CAFA'sjurisdictional policy, it is useful to pause
to consider some additional factors that should bear on jurisdictional
policy. Such an analysis raises questions about CAFA's jurisdictional
reality.
As all are aware, subject matter jurisdiction enjoys a special status:
it cannot be waived and can be raised at any time. 70 As I tell my stu-
dents, it is a time bomb in the plaintiffs' suit. One can challenge the
idea that jurisdiction is somehow differen t and even support that
challenge with some Supreme Court precedent. 72 The Court remains,
69 Thus, in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, the Court said that "the plaintiff must pay
for the cost of notice [to the class] as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own
suit." 417 U.S. 156, 179 (1974). Since it will be the lawyer, not the class representative,
who pays this cost, the thrust of this statement seems to be to regard the class action as
counsel's device. Somewhat similarly, in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, the
Court said that "the right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, an-
cillary to the litigation of substantive claims." 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980).
70 See, e.g., FED. R. CiV. P. 12(h) (3) (directing the court to dismiss the case if at any
time it determines that it lacks subject matterjurisdiction).
71 See Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613,
1615-27 (2003) (arguing that there is no qualitative difference between 'jurisdictional"
questions and "merits" questions); see also Howard M. Wasserman,Jurisdiction and Mer-
its, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 656-62 (2005) (discussing courts' practice of erroneously
treating factual elements of a plaintiff's claim as jurisdictional in nature); cf. Arbaugh
v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510, 516 (2006) (noting that the Court "has sometimes
been profligate" in using the term 'jurisdiction" and holding that the need to prove
that the defendant employed fifteen employees in order to maintain a suit under Title
ViI was not 'jurisdictional").
72 Thus, although the Court has said that 'jurisdictional" issues must be resolved
first, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1998), it has also
said that "there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy," and that personal jurisdic-
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nonetheless, committed to this absolutist attitude about the perils of
failing to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. 73
Given the fatal consequences of being wrong about jurisdiction,
clear and easily applied rules should be an important objective of ju-
risdictional policy. Measured by this standard, CAFA bristles with dif-
ficulties. Consider that a "class action" is removable under CAFA only
when at least two basic requirements are satisfied:
(1) There are at least 100 class members. 4 In many instances
that is easy to determine, but with some frequency it is not. It
certainly has happened in the past that classes turn out to
consist of far fewer people than was initially supposed.7
5
Moreover, the statute refers to "proposed plaintiff classes,"' 6
which may mean that a defendant (if plaintiff has filed in state
court) must decipher the plaintiffs' class definition before it
can even begin to determine how large the class is.
(2) The "matter in controversy" exceeds $5 million. Satisfy-
ing this provision may be easy in a number of instances, but
given the room for debate about how large the class is, and
about the dimensions of individual claims, there will be cases
in which it will be uncertain whether this requirement is satis-
fied.
Further, the grounds for remanding or declining jurisdiction then
offer multiple additional uncertainties:
tion may be resolved before subject matter jurisdiction is established. Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999). Further, in Sinochem International Co. v.
Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2007), the Court held that a
dismissal on forum non conveniens nonmerits grounds could occur even before the
court determines whether it has jurisdiction.
73 See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2367 (2007) (holding that the appeal
of a habeas corpus petitioner had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the
notice of appeal was filed late, even though the district judge had made a mistake
about when the notice was due and the petitioner had filed it before the date specified
by the district judge). Justice Souter denounced the majority's decision as a "bait and
switch," id. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting), and the decision was harshly criticized in
the press. See, e.g., Editorial, Don't Listen to What the Man Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2007, § 4, at 11 (attacking the decision as "wrong and mean-spirited").
74 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (5) (B) (Supp. V 2005).
Admittedly there may be a limited risk of later dismissal due to an incorrect de-
termination at the outset that the class has at least 100 members. Indeed, it could be
that the ultimate class is defined much differently than the one originally proposed.
But the existence of these variables underscores the possibility of active litigation about
the scope of CAFAjurisdiction.
76 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (3).
77 Id. § 1332(d) (2).
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(1) The class may be subject to a required remand if more
than two-thirds of the class members are citizens of the state in
which the case was filed.78 For both the plaintiffs and the de-
fendants, this determination may be extremely difficult.
Given the difficulties that often attend working up a list of
class members to give them notice of class certification, mak-
ing this calculation at the beginning of a case will be at least as
difficult. The determination may also include figuring out
whether fewer than one-third of the class members are citizens
of the forum state because that bears on whether the court. .. . . 79
may decline to exercise jurisdiction.
(2) It may be critical whether all the "primary defendants" are
citizens of the state in which the suit was filed."" Making this
determination may require the court to scrutinize the grounds
for liability (without making a "merits" determination) in
terms of CAFA's criteria.
(3) Alternatively, it may be critical to determine whether, if
one of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the suit
was filed, that defendant is one "from whom significant relief
is sought""' and "whose alleged conduct forms a significant
basis for the claims asserted."2 If these criteria are satisfied, it
must also be shown that "principal injuries resulting from the
alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant
were incurred" in the forum, in which case a remand will be
ordered .
(4) Finally and additionally, one must determine whether, dur-
ing the three years before this case was filed, any other class ac-
tion against any of the defendants was filed "asserting the same
or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants."84
On its face, this gauntlet is extremely difficult to satisfy, but for
our purposes the key point is that there could be considerable debate
or uncertainty about whether any of these criteria have been satisfied.
CAFA thus presents the parties (and the courts) with a series of
difficult determinations to be made under the jurisdictional sword of
Damocles. Arguably, a good deal of discovery would be necessary to
78 Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A) (i) (1), (d)(4)(B).
79 Id. § 1332(d) (3).
80 Id. § 1332(d) (4) (B).
81 Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A) (i) (If) (aa).
82 Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A) (i) (II) (b).
83 Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A) (i) (I11).
84 Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A) (ii).
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apply these provisions. Although the legislative history sought to stave
off this result,85 defense lawyers promptly saw the possibility. 86
At least some decisions show that these difficulties are real. For
example, in one case, the Eleventh Circuit was presented with a claim
of toxic contamination of property in Anniston, Alabama over an
eighty-five-year period. The claim was brought on behalf of a class
consisting of property owners or lessees of the allegedly contaminated
property and people who suffered personal injury from coming in
contact with the deposited waste substances on this property. 8 After
removal, plaintiffs sought remand, relying on the affidavit of their at-
torney, which asserted that she had reviewed or interviewed over
10,000 potential plaintiffs, determined that some 5200 were members
88
of the class, and that 93.8% of those 5200 were Alabama citizens.
Reversing a district court order remanding the case, the appellate
court found this evidence insufficient to show that more than two-
thirds of the class members were Alabama citizens. It emphasized that
plaintiffs' counsel did not explain how she selected the 10,000 people
she considered, and that the class defined in the complaint was "ex-
85 See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 44 (2005), reprinted.in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 42, which
states:
The Committee understands that in assessing the various criteria established
in all these new jurisdictional provisions, a federal court may have to engage
in some fact-finding, not unlike what is necessitated by the existing jurisdic-
tional statutes.... However, the Committee cautions that these jurisdictional
determinations should be made largely on the basis of readily available infor-
mation. Allowing substantial, burdensome discovery on jurisdictional issues
would be contrary to the intent of these provisions to encourage the exercise
of federal jurisdiction over class actions.
86 For a discussion of this impact, see William Sullivan & James Fazio III, Changing
the Game: Jurisdiction Maneuvering and Early Settlements Likely Results of Class Action Fair-
ness Act, RECORDER (S.F.),June 8, 2005, available at GALE GENERAL ONEFILE, Doc. No.
A133132221:
These determinations would appear to require significant discovery from de-
fendants early in the litigation. If defendants are forced to reveal consider-
able information about the size and location of plaintiff-customers and the in-
juries they have sustained, that would seem to encourage early settlement
because it would give plaintiffs' counsel more information about their claims
and potential damages earlier than they might otherwise obtain it.
See also Eron Ben-Yehuda, Class-Action Law Could Spark Growth ofJiurisdiction Experts, S.F.
DALvJ., Aug. 26, 2005, at 1 (suggesting that there might be a need for expert testi-
mony on whether two-thirds of the class members are citizens of one state).
87 Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159,1161 (11th Cir. 2006).
88 Id. at 1166.
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tremely broad, extending over an 85-year period."'' As a result, the
court had "no way of knowing what percentage of the plaintiff class
are Alabama citizens." 90
Contrast that example with a suit brought on behalf of a class of
patients in a New Orleans hospital and their next of kin, alleging that
the hospital failed to have proper emergency procedures at the time
that Hurricane Katrina struck the city.9' A list of the 256 patients in
the hospital at the time of the hurricane showed that only 2.83% indi-
cated an out-of-state address, and that of the thirty-five patients who
912died, all but two had Louisiana addresses. The district court granted
a remand motion,93 and the appellate court affirmed, relying on
CAFA's provision permitting discretionary remand when over one-
third of the class members are citizens of the forum and other circum-
stances showed a strong local interest.9 4 Nonetheless, the diaspora of
New Orleans residents in the wake of the hurricane raised questions
about whether even one-third of the class members should still be
considered Louisiana citizens. A defendant who opposed remand
hired a private investigator to trace the current mailing addresses of
known class members, and the investigator's information showed that
many then resided outside Louisiana.'
5 The remand proponents
6
submitted statements from eight potential class members then resid-
ing outside Louisiana who affirmed their intention to return to New
97Orleans when able to do so. Another argument against remand was
that the precise size of the class had not been decided, making the
one-third calculation impossible.9" Stressing that the defined class
"clearly involves a finite group of persons," 99 the appellate court af-
firmed remand because "the submitted evidence provides an adequate
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 804, 808 (5th
Cir. 2007).
92 Id. at 815.
9.11 Id. at 808-09.
94 Id. at 823-24.
95 Id. at815.
96 One defendant joined in the remand motion, and plaintiffs eventually dropped
their support for the motion.
97 Preston, 485 F.3d at 817.
98 Id. at 820 ("Arguably, without knowing the number of persons in the class, the
court cannot determine whether one-third of the class members are citizens of Louisi-
ana.").
99 Id. at 821.
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basis for the district court to make a credible estimate of the class
members domiciled in Louisiana,"0 ° which excused "exhaustive dis-
covery capable of determining the exact class size to an empirical cer-
tainty."'10' It therefore distinguished the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
the toxic contamination case, but suggested that in a comparable case
it might reach a similar conclusion. 102
The same Fifth Circuit panel confirmed this suggestion in revers-
ing the remand of a companion Katrina case on behalf of patients in
another New Orleans medical facility. 103 "Despite the undeniably local
character of this class action lawsuit," this remand was not based on
the discretionary local controversy provision of CAFA, and the plain-
tiffs had to show that two-thirds of the class members were Louisiana
residents. 104 A critical difference was that the case discussed above-
in which remand wasjustified-was filed about a month after the hur-
ricane, while this case was filed nearly a year after the events in ques-
tion. As in the first case, the medical records indicated that the great
majority of the patients had Louisiana addresses. But the court con-
cluded that it could not presume, without more, that these Louisiana
residents were also Louisiana citizens, since that depends on domicile,
which in turn depends on the intention to remain in the state. The
court refused to conclude that "the medical records serve as a proxy
for domicile." 106 At least by the time this case was filed, the court held,
the pre-Katrina addresses in the medical records failed to satisfy the
10o Id. at 820.
101 Id. at 821.
102 The court stated, id.:
We would probably invoke a different analysis if, for example, the class defini-
tion included persons trapped in the Ninth Ward in the hours and days fol-
lowing Hurricane Katrina and the levee breach. Under this hypothetical, the
ability to quantify such a class, much less parse renters from property owners
and other relevant complications, would require more evidence than before
the court in this appeal. Here, we know the number of patients. We also know
the patients' names, emergency contact information for the deceased patients,
and the discrete time period of the episodic event giving rise to the litigation.
Moreover, we are not dealing with a class of patients receiving medical care
from a national hospital that regularly services out-of-state patients. Memorial
Medical Center is a local health care facility primarily servicing the local citi-
zens of New Orleans, as evinced by the local addresses and phone numbers
found in the medical records.
103 Id. at 803-04.
104 Id. at 800.
105 See id. at 798 (reporting that of 299 patients, 242 listed Louisiana addresses).
0 Id. at 799.
2008] ASSESSING CAFA S STA TED JURISDICTIONAL POLICY
plaintiffs' burden of showing that two-thirds of the class members
were domiciled in Louisiana when the suit was filed. 107 "Despite the
logistical challenges of offering reliable evidence at this preliminary
jurisdictional stage, CAFA does not permit the courts to make a citi-
zenship determination based on a record bare of any evidence show-
ing class members' intent to be domiciled in Louisiana."'
0 8
As should be evident, these issues can be challenging to unravel.
But before condemning the statute on that ground, one ought to con-
sider some competing factors. First, the jurisdictional determinations
that must be made are not entirely different from those that were re-
quired previously. Before Exxon, courts deciding whether there was
jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members under Zahn
had to determine whether the claim of each class member satisfied
the jurisdictional minimum. That determination could require a
court either to gather considerable information about those class
members' claims or indulge in assumptions that might seem unwar-
ranted given the critical importance ofjurisdiction. It would also have
to make this determination about class members' claims without what
might be called "first move" information about what plaintiffs seek
that is available when an individual plaintiff asserts a claim for relief.09
The prevailing analysis, then, is to ask whether a claim for more than
the jurisdictional minimum is made in good faith, " 0 and that becomes
a good deal more difficult when no such claim has been made. For
unnamed class members, ordinarily no such individual claim is made,
so the court must first hypothesize what it might be. Often that would
be more difficult than determining whether the aggregate claims of
the class could total more than $5 million.
Second, the courts have assigned the burdens of proof under
CAFA in ways that may minimize these difficulties. Thus, it is nor-
mally held that the defendant seeking the removal must demonstrate
that the numerosity and amount-in-controversy requirements are satis-
107 Id. at 802.
108 Id. For more Katrina illustrations, see generally Martin v. Lafon Nursing Facility
of the Holy Family, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 348 (E.D. La. 2007), and Martin v. Lafon Nursing Facil-
ity of the Holy Family, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 352 (E.D. La. 2007), which both deal with whether
the Louisiana healthcare provider privilege law precluded the discovery that the plain-
tiffs sought in order to address the question of remand.
109 Obviously this information is regularly harder to get in individual cases when
the plaintiff sues in state court.
110 Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90 (1938).
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fled,"' and plaintiffs trying to invoke statutory exceptions in order to
obtain remand to state court must prove that they apply." 2 Although
the courts may be enforcing those burdens so vigorously that they
erode the value of the right to remove or obtain a remand," 3 the bur-
dens simplify the process.
Third, although these criteria for exemption from CAFA are diffi-
cult to apply, it is not clear that other criteria would be easier. Given
the understandable effort in Congress to minimize the exemptions to
the newjurisdiction,114 it may well be that any criteria would have pre-
sented difficulties of application. An entirely different arrangement
might have solved these problems. Alan Morrison, for example,
urged that the decision whether to permit removal be vested in a body
like the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, thus avoiding the
need to have district judges make the sort of close calls that CAFA re-
quires. " 5 Although this proposal to rely on a panel was in keeping
with an earlier ALI proposal,1 6 it would introduce a new wrinkle in
removal that could delay and complicate that process.
IV. THE TWO PRONGS OF CAFA'SJURISDICTIONAL POLICY
CAFA was justified on the basis of essentially two jurisdictional
policies: it provided that federal class action procedures would be
available for handling many state law class action cases, and it ensured
III See, e.g., Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 996, 1004 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that when the plaintiff class's prayer is for "in total, less than five million
dollars," defendant must show that actually more is at issue if it desires to remove the case
to federal court (internal quotation marks omitted)); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co.,
443 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that CAFA does not change the requirement
that a removing defendant must show thatjurisdiction has been established).
112 See, e.g., Preston, 485 F.3d at 813 (requiring plaintiffs to prove the applicability of
the "local controversy" and "home state" exceptions); Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478
F.3d 1018, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that "the party seeking remand" bears
the burden of proving an exception to CAFA's jurisdiction); Hart v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 679-82 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that placing the burden
of proving the applicability of one of the exceptions on the plaintiff is consistent with
the statutory language, legislative history, and stated purpose of the statute).
113 See supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text (discussing the class action cases
arising out of Hurricane Katrina).
14 See infra notes 200-201 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for a
congressional preference for limiting the opportunities for plaintiffs' lawyers to avoid
federal court).
115 Morrison, supra note 8, at 1523.
16 See ALI, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY REcOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
§ 3.02 (1994) (urging the creation of a Complex Litigation Panel to determine when
cases should be shifted to a common forum).
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a federal forum for cases of national significance. It seems that each
of these purposes is unobjectionable on its face, although one could
readily argue about matters of calibration, making questions of over-
breadth relevant here.
Before turning to these policy justifications, however, it is worth
noting that some of the objections to the legislation themselves seem
overblown. Thus, although there were assertions that all or almost all
state court class actions would end up in federal court under CAFA, at
least in some states that certainly has not been the case." 7 Objections
that CAFA is pro-defendant may also be overtaken by future events.
As the academic flip-flop on the desirability of litigating in federal
court between the 1970s and the present illustrates,"" current prefer-
ences may change. Indeed, one could even make an argument that in
the long run CAFA will inure to the benefit of consumer plaintiffs.
Certainly the legislation includes a stated endorsement for class ac-
tions on behalf of consumers;" 9 by making federal court jurisdiction
more readily available for such suits, it may enable litigation of exactly
the sort that defense interests would not welcome. Moreover, should
it also produce a shift away from either Erie or Klaxon, 20 CAFA would
become a more potent instrument for such suits. Thus, although
some supporters of the legislation regard it as a step toward curtailing
private enforcement of public law,' 2 the statute could boomerang
against them.
117 In California, for example, preliminary data on state court class action filings do
show a decline in the number of class actions filed in 2005 compared to the number
filed in 2004, but the number filed in 2005 was nonetheless higher than the number
filed in 2003, which in turn was higher than the number filed in 2002. Put differently,
the number filed in 2005 was approximately fifty percent higher than the number filed
in 2002. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROGRESS REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITYEE ON
CIVIL RULES ON THE IMPACT OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 3-5 & fig. 1 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.fjc.gov/ptiblic/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafal 107.pdf/$file/cafa 107.pdf.
Supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
Thus, the first congressional finding supporting CAFA endorses such suits. See
CAFA § 2(a)(l), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Stipp. V 2005) ("Class action lawsuits are an
important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the fair and efficient
resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the claims to be aggre-
gated into a single action against a defendant that has allegedly caused harm.").
See infra Part V (discussing the possibility of a slippery slope away from Erie and
Klaxon and toward the development of substantively uniform law by the federal judici-
ary).*
1
2 1 See, e.g., John H. Beisner et al., Class Action "Cops": Public Servants or Private En-
trepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1451-62 (2005) (attacking the entire idea of "private
attorneys general" enforcing the law via class actions).
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A. Preferring and Protecting Federal Class Action Procedures
Federal procedure no longer follows state court procedure. By
definition, where the two diverge, the federal version is preferred by
the federal courts on grounds of superiority, and the Supreme Court
has endorsed that preference.22 So long as rules of federal procedure
23
are "arguably procedural," the federal courts must apply them. Al-
though the notion that the federal rules are better ought not prompt
courts to apply them to override "substantive" state law, it is certainly
legitimate for Congress to treat federal procedures as preferable in
making decisions about the calibration of federal court jurisdiction.
In addition, the structural and operating characteristics of federal
courts might legitimately be considered in making decisions about ju-
risdictional allocation. Thus, without taking the view that it is a viola-
tion of due process to subject parties to the decisions of elected
judges, 2 4 one might sensibly resist the preference of plaintiffs' lawyers
for "local judges [who] are elected by the very people whose disputes
they will hear,"''2 5 particularly if one were concerned about the litiga-
tion fate of a nonlocal corporate party. Similarly, since Congress has
121long been on record as favoring case management by federal courts,
Some relatively fervent opponents of CAFA nonetheless seem to appreciate the
possibility that federal court class actions could advance the consumer cause. See David
Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Ju-
risdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1247, 1287 (2007) (noting that "[t]he empowerment
of the multistate class action in federal court in the 1980s meant that underlying state
law had more regulatory bite").
122 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 n.1, 474 (1965) (explaining that the
method of service of process in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 is "less cumbersome"
than the competing state method and must be followed by the federal court).
123 This, at least, is the way in which one Justice read the majority's opinion. Id. at
476 (Harlan,J., concurring).
124 See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 504 (1986) ("[D]ue process is inade-
quately protected when an individual must depend on an adjudicator who lacks salary
and tenure protection ... to protect an entidement to a life, liberty, or property inter-
est.").
125 Walker, supra note 42, at 22; see also supra text accompanying note 42 (quoting
Walker to differentiate the attitudes of elected local judges-who are under pressure
to provide "fair and quick adjudication"-from those of overburdened, life-appointed
federal judges-who may be more likely to limit discovery or grant summary judg-
ment).
126 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 §§ 102, 471, 28 U.S.C. § 471 & note (2000).
This act directed all federal district courts to adopt programs to improve their han-
dling of civil litigation, in large measure by using case management. The legislative
history invoked the "benefits of enhanced case management," which it took to mean
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it should not be surprising that Congress might regard it as important
to adopt jurisdictional rules that bring cases before courts that employ
such methods. This is particularly true in light of the good indications
that plaintiffs' lawyers shun federal court to avoid such constraint. 
27
A different procedural consideration in favor of CAFA's expan-
sion of federal court jurisdiction is the problem of overlapping class
actions. Whether or not one would favor expanding federal court ju-
risdiction to alleviate the difficulties presented by simultaneous class
actions in different state courts, the challenges that parallel state court
litigation produces for the attempt to effectively handle federal court
class actions provide a justification for some legislative response-
particularly if one regards federal class action procedures as prefer-
able.
1. Improved Class Action Procedures
In many ways, the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were a leap into
the dark. l1 s In at least some ways, things ultimately turned out pre-
cisely as the drafters desired they not. '2  It might properly be ex-
pected that a rulemaking response would be in order at some point,
and after a quarter-century moratorium on changing Rule 23, in 1991
the Advisory Committee began studying what had actually happened
under the rule. It spent a dozen years on this task, first proposing
some modifications to the standards for certifying Rule 23(b) (3) class
actions. 30 These proposals to change the standards for certifying class
"that greater and earlier judicial control over civil cases yields faster rates of disposi-
tion." S. REP. No. 101-416, at 16 (1990), reninted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6819.
See supra text accompanying note 42 (asserting that plaintiffs' lawyers prefer
state courts because "federal courts have increasingly engaged in stringent control of
discovery, aggressive encouragement of settlement, and more frequent granting of
summary judgment").
128 For a careful description of the debates that attended the adoption of the 1966
amendments, see Rabiej, supra note 12, at 333-45.
129 After much debate, the drafters included a strong warning against use of class
actions in mass torts in the Committee Note. Id. at 341-43. Yet in the 1 980s courts be-
gan to experiment with such class actions, and the Supreme Court recognized in Am-
chem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), that the rule did not categorically
exclude class actions and that "District Courts, since the late 1970's, have been certify-
ing such cases in increasing number." Id. at 625. At most, it concluded, the Advisory
Committee's warning "continues to call for caution." Id.
130 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF APPELLATE, CI\L, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 45-51 (1996) (setting forth sev-
eral draft amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)).
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actions proved both very difficult and highly controversial, 3' and ul-
timately were not pursued. The only part of that amendment package
that went forward was Rule 23(f)'s authorization for immediate appel-
late review of class-certification decisions.132 Although Rule 23(f) did
not change standards for class certification, it provided a method to
address concerns that different district courts had adopted divergent
approaches to those standards and that, under existing law on timing
of appellate review, there was usually no opportunity for appellate
courts to speak to these questions. From 1998 forward, that gap in
class action law has been plugged by this amendment to the federal
rules.
But the Advisory Committee did not relent in its efforts to im-
prove the class action procedure in federal courts. Instead, it shifted
attention to the process for handling class actions, and in particular to
aspects of class action practice that were not the focus of the 1966
amendments and emerged as important only in the 1980s and 1990s.
The experience of those years demonstrated that the role of class
counsel was central to class action practice, that attorneys' fees were a
critical animating feature of that practice, and that settlement review
constituted a central responsibility of the court to ensure proper func-
tioning of class actions.
Under the 1966 version of the rule, there was virtually nothing to
guide the courts on these topics that experience had shown were cru-
cial to proper handling of class actions. True, the 1966 version of
Rule 23(e) did specify that a class action could not be dismissed with-
out court approval, but it added nothing more about how that ap-
proval should be meted out. The rule said nothing at all about class
counsel, although judicial interpretation of the requirements of Rule
23(a) (4) served partially to plug that gap by focusing on the adequacy
of class counsel as well as on the class representative. Serious ques-
tions nonetheless remained about the proper responsibility of class
counsel should there be disagreements within the class or, worse yet,
between counsel's original client (the class representative) and the in-
terests of the class at large. A number of thoughtful observers-
131 See sources cited supra note 13 (detailing extensively the debate over the
changes).
132 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f) (allowing the courts of appeals discretion to hear ap-
peals of class certification decisions within ten days of the district court's ruling on the
matter).
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including Professor Shapiro1 3 -focused on these issues. And there
was not a word in the rule about attorneys' fees, even though thought-
ful commentators urged that attention to this topic would be crucial
to establishing a proper balance in class action practice.13 4 In addi-
tion, the 1966 directive that class-certification decisions be made "as
soon as practicable" had produced mischief in a number of instances,
although courts have gradually developed a nuanced understanding
of its application.
The 2003 amendments to Rule 23 broadly responded to these
concerns. In place of the former directive to resolve class certification
"as soon as practicable," Rule 23(c) now says that it must be done "at
an early practicable time."'" It also directs that the class-certification
order define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, which
can offer both discipline to the district court and guidance to the ap-
pellate court, if there is immediate appellate review of the certification
decision."" The amended rule also removes language that formerly
appeared to prompt courts to believe it was appropriate to issue "con-
ditional" certifications (partly to comply with the "as soon as practica-
ble" language in the 1966 Rule) before the record was sufficient to
make a determination whether to certify a class action.'3 7 In addition,
the amended rule provides considerable direction on the contents of
class-certification notice to Rule 23(b) (3) class members, including
the directive that the notice be "in plain, easily understood lan-
13 See Shapiro, supra note 45, at 939 (discussing the need to "focus on the precise
nature of the lawyer's professional responsibility in class actions," and suggesting that
"the notion of paying special attention to ethical issues in the class action context has
merit in several respects" (footnote omitted)).
134 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND CORP. & INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, Ex-
ecutive Summary, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRVATE
GAIN 24 (1999), available at http://wwv.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/2005/
MR969.l.pdf (saying that "what judges do is key to determining the benefit-cost ratio"
in class actions, and that salutary results followed when judges "took responsibility for
determining attorney fees").
135 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
136 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
137 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (allowing for an order to be altered or amended
only before final judgment). As noted in the Committee Note, the former provision
that class certification "may be conditional" was deleted because "[a] court that is not
satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification
until they have been met." FED. R. CiV. P. 23 advisory committee's note (2003).
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guage. ' ' 1 8 Further, it at least raises the possibility of some similar no-
tice in Rule 23(b) (1) and (b) (2) class actions.'
39
In addition, Rule 23(e) was substantially expanded in 2003 to di-
rect the court (and the parties) on how to conduct a proper settle-
ment review. It now requires a hearing, and adopts the "fair, reason-
able, and adequate" standard for the proposed settlement, which is
derived from the case law on the subject.'40 To deal with the problem
of "side agreements," it directs the parties to identify any such
"agreement made in connection with the proposal."' 41 It makes clear
that the court may decline to approve a proposed settlement in a Rule
23(b) (3) class action unless class members are accorded an opportu-
nity to opt out after receiving notice of the actual deal.' 42 Finally, the
new Rule 23(e) provides guidance on objections by class members, in-
cluding a directive that objectors may only withdraw their objections
with the court's approval, a provision included to deal with the prob-
lem of buy-offs of objectors. 
43
Besides greatly expanding treatment of topics covered in the 1966
Rule, the 2003 amendments grapple with important matters not ad-
dressed in 1966. Rules 23(g) and (h) thus address the appointment
of class counsel and the handling of attorneys' fee awards to them and
to objectors. Responding to concerns like those raised by Professor
Shapiro, 44 the rule now states that "[c]lass counsel must fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class." 145 It also specifies the
1M FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c) (2) (B).
139 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2) (A) (granting the court discretion to direct such no-
tice).
140 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (2).
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (3).
142 FED. R. CI. P. 23(e) (4).
143 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e) (5).
144 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 2 3 (g)(4). The Committee Note to the 2003 Rule 23(g) (1) (B)
expands on the meaning of this directive:
The rule thus establishes the obligation of class counsel, an obligation that
may be different from the customary obligations of counsel to individual cli-
ents. Appointment as class counsel means that the primary obligation of
counsel is to the class rather than to any individual members of it. The class
representatives do not have an unfettered right to "fire" class counsel. In the
same vein, the class representatives cannot command class counsel to accept
or reject a settlement proposal. To the contrary, class counsel must determine
whether seeking the court's approval of a settlement would be in the best in-
terests of the class as a whole.
FED. R. Cni. P. 23 advisory committee's note (2003).
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criteria that must be considered in evaluating proposed class coun-
sel, 46 authorizes consideration of "any other matter pertinent to
counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class," 147 and suggests that the court might make provision in the or-
der appointing class counsel about an eventual award of attorneys'
fees.4 4 At a minimum, the court must ensure that class counsel is
adequate, and if there is more than one applicant for the position, the
court must choose the applicant "best able to represent the interests
of the class."'149 Regarding attorneys' fees, the rule explicitly recog-
nizes the need to give notice to the class of the application for such an
award 15 and the right of class members to object.15
Although individually these new provisions are hardly a radical
break from the past, 152 together they represent an important ad-
vance.15 Together with the 1998 addition of Rule 23(f), which facili-
tated the development of a body of appellate law on class-certification
criteria, the new provisions provide a nationwide framework for the
federal courts to deal effectively with the problems raised by contem-
porary class action practice. Congress could rationally favor the use of
these federal criteria for class actions generally, or at least for a subset
of class actions it regarded as particularly important for other reasons
as well.14 Further, there is no doubt that Congress was attentive to at
least some of the concerns addressed by the amendments to Rule 23.
Earlier versions of CAFA included, for example, a "plain English" re-
quirement for class notices that is mirrored in the amended rule.1
55
Congress, however, was unsatisfied with what the rulemakers had
done on certain topics and added its own overlay with CAFA. For in-
stance, CAFA provided special requirements for "coupon" settlements,
146 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) (1) (A).
147 FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(g) (1) (B).
148 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) (1) (D).
149 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2).
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h) (1).
151 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(h)(2).
152 Many of them were based on "best practices" that had been developed under
the 1966 rule.
1I admit that my attitude may be affected by my involvement in the drafting of
these proposals. See Rabiej, supra note 12, at 381 n.240 (noting that I drafted Rules
23(g) and (h)).
B4 For a more detailed explanation of the grounds for Congress to favor having
nationwide class actions in federal court, see infra Part IV.B.
155 E.g., H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. § 1715 (2002); S. 353, 106th Cong. § 1713(c)(2)
(1999); S. 2083, 105th Cong. § 1713(c)(1) (1998); S. 1501, 104th Cong. § 1711(g)(1)
(1995). For the rules provision, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B).
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addressing in particular the attorneys' fee awards in cases involving
such settlements. 156 It required that state and national regulatory au-
thorities be given notice of a proposed class action settlement, 157 in-
cluding a provision (which appears to be mandatory) regarding side
agreements that may override the more nuanced rule version.'5"
Overall, CAFA built on the 2003 amendments to the Rule and thus
confirmed Congress's preference for the regime put in place by the
amendments to Rule 23.
One may certainly argue that the new provisions of Rule 23-or
the additions Congress made to them-were unwise, 159 but they are
important changes that Congress could properly take into account in
deciding whether to expand federal court jurisdiction. Moreover,
even those who denounce CAFA's "true" motivations concede that the
Advisory Committee's actions are not similarly questionable. 60 Fur-
thermore, the new provisions have had effects in some cases. For ex-
ample, a district court in Miami declined to approve a coupon settle-
ment in a consumer class action after thirty-six state attorneys general
opposed it.1"i Ensuring application of improved federal class action
procedures, therefore, is one jurisdictional policy that does legiti-
mately support CAFA.
Against this policy, however, it may be urged that "federalizing"
state law class actions prevents states from using their own class action
56 CAFA§ 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b) (2) (Supp. V 2005).
157 CAFA § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1715.
158 Compare CAFA § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (5) (requiring service of notice on state
and federal officials including "any settlement or other agreement contemporaneously
made between class counsel and counsel for the defendants"), with FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e) (3) (requiring only the filing of "a statement identifying any agreement made in
connection with the proposal" to settle; the full agreement need not be provided).
159 For an argument denouncing the required notice to state and federal regula-
tory authorities, see Laurens Walker, Essay, The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A
Policy and Political Mistake, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 849, 853-55 (2007), asserting that ambi-
tious politicians will use the opportunity to object to proposed settlements as a plat-
form for their personal political advancement.
160 See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 8, at 1538 (commenting that the Advisory Com-
mittee "is recognized as not favoring either plaintiffs or defendants in class actions").
161 See Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1328 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (noting that the attorneys general, as amicus curiae, "have objected at every turn
to each version of the parties' proposed coupon settlement"); see alsoJulie Kay, Miami
Judge Rejects Settlement in Sharper Image Class Action, REcORDER (S.F.), Oct. 15, 2007,
available at GALE GENERAL ONEFILE, Doc. No. A169911289 (calling the rejection a
"stunning blow" to the defendant); Linda S. Mullenix, CAFA and Coupons, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 12, 2007, at 24 (writing that "[t]he objectors' persistence, and the substance of
their criticisms" convinced the judge to reject the settlement).
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procedures to enforce their laws.162 At first blush, there is some force
to this criticism, particularly as federal courts may have become more
demanding about class-certification criteria. 10 To the extent that
negative-value suits are at issue, neutralizing the class action may hob-
ble private enforcement of state consumer protection laws and similar
measures. Upon further reflection, however, this argument seems less
than compelling. It largely disregards history by ignoring the fact that
it was the federal courts that served as trailblazers in their use of class
actions after the 1966 revision of Rule 23. Certainly that experience
may have prompted states to be even more adventuresome, but the
original importance of the federal rule suggests that using jurisdiction
to ensure that an improved federal rule will govern multistate class ac-
tions is a legitimate goal.
Presumably, the concern with blunting state court enforcement of
state law has force only when state courts would certify a particular
class action that federal courts would not. 164 Although inappropriate
refusal to certify a class is a legitimate concern, inappropriate certifi-
cation is also a valid consideration. Surely there have been at least
some "drive-by certifications" in state courts, so urging that state
courts should have untrammelled authority to certify in cases where a
federal court might shy away from doing so is dubious. To the con-
trary, the federal courts-in part due to the new opportunity for im-
mediate appellate review of class-certification decisions-seem to de-
serve some deference to their decisions. True, a number of states
accused in the past of being too free with class certification have
changed their ways.' 6" But isolated incidents of voluntary reform do
not constitute a strong argument to counter Congress's preference for
having federaljudges decide such matters.
162 For example, speaking against an earlier version of CAFA, Representative Lee
(Dem., Texas) warned that "in cases where the federal court chooses not to certify the
state class action, the bill prohibits the states from using class actions to resolve the un-
derlying state causes of action." Class Action Fairness Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 2341
Before the H. Comm. on theJudicimy, 107th Cong. 9 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (state-
ment of Rep. SheilaJackson Lee).
163 See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There
Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709 (2000) (reporting
that scrutiny of class certification requirements in federal court class actions has be-
come more heightened in recent years than that of some Gulf Coast state courts).
ICA A competing concern, which CAFA does address, is that state court certification
of multistate classes can intrude on the law-enforcement activities of other states.
165 See Marcus, supra note 121, at 1294-95 (describing states' curtailment of aggres-
sive certification policies).
1797
1798 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1765
Moreover, at least in some places, it seems that CAFA is affecting
how state courts handle similar issues. Regarding coupon settlements,
for example, "[a]Ithough the federal law doesn't apply in state courts,
legal experts say California Superior Court judges are following suit
and using extra caution before approving coupon settlements."'' 66 Re-
cently, for example, a California state court class action brought
against producers of smokeless tobacco products resulted in a cash
settlement even though similar cases in other states had been settled
for coupons. As one defense attorney explained, "[w]e're paying cash
in California basically because plaintiffs took the position that a cou-
pon settlement would not be approved."'' 67 This ripple effect of CAFA
on state court practices undercuts the argument that the proper en-
forcement of state law depends on freeing state courts from the con-
straints applicable in federal court. State courts can also innovate on
their own. Alameda County Superior Court in California, for exam-
ple, has begun withholding part of class counsel's fees pending com-
pletion of the claims-review process in order to give counsel an added
incentive to ensure that this process goes smoothly.1
68
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that states will promptly
fall into line with current federal class action practices. Again, Cali-
fornia provides an illustration. In early 2007, a bill was introduced in
the California Legislature that would substitute a provision that virtu-
ally replicates Rule 23 for the current barebones California legislation
authorizing class actions.'69 The proposal was promoted by the Civil
Justice Association of California, a "tort reform" group. Although
Governor Schwarzenegger publicly supported the bill, it was killed in
committee after a plaintiffs' lawyer attacked it as "anti-consumer."
170
After this legislative defeat, there was talk of trying to enact a similar
166 Rebecca Beyer, Coupon-Based Settlements Get Tougher, S.F. DAILYJ., May 29, 2007,
at I.
167 Matthew Hirsch, CA Plaintiffs on Verge of $96M Cash Settlement, RECORDER (S.F.),
Oct. 17, 2007, available at GALE GENERAL ONEFILE, Doc. No. A170284382.
168 See Matthew Hirsch, Fees Account for "Human Nature": Alameda Courts Delay Some
Pay to Keep Class Counsel on Toes, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 21, 2007, available at GALE
GENERAL ONEFILE, Doc. No. A171853976, (describing the Alameda County Superior
Court's practice and reporting that "some attorneys say the strategy isn't common
elsewhere").
169 See Assem. B. 1505, 2007-08 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (creating "a comprehensive
set of procedures to be followed in all class actions").
170 Cheryl Miller, Lawmakers Reject New Class Action Rules, RECORDER (S.F.), May 9,
2007, available at GALE GENERAL ONEFILE, Doc. No. A163174405.
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provision by initiative.' Frankly, it is difficult to regard current Rule
23 as either anti- or pro-consumer, but this episode underscores the
extent to which such labels can influence attitudes in the area. Most
likely, similar attitudes influenced members of Congress in deciding
whether to support CAFA. The point here is not that such influences
do not matter, but rather that, independent of these concerns that the
legislation favors one side or another, there are legitimate reasons for
favoring federal court jurisdiction, at least for national class actions.
To the extent that this means that state courts that would have permit-
ted similar class actions do not get a chance to do so, that is an argu-
ment Congress could have rationally considered and rejected.
Additionally, it must be recognized that CAFA will not completely
prevent the potential problem of evading the federal court's class ac-
tion protections. The prime example would arise if the parties chose
to avoid the exacting federal court settlement-approval standards by
instead presenting a proposed settlement to a state court, where a fol-
low-on class action had been filed for this specific purpose. Perhaps
CAFA could have been modified to avoid this risk. One possible way of
precluding such strategic maneuvering--included in earlier legisla-
tion 172-would be to permit any class member to remove the case at
any time, including during consideration of settlement approval by a
state court. Such a provision, however, would create its own difficul-
ties, and the measures actually adopted in CAFA are a reasonable com-
promise.
2. Dealing with the Problems of Overlapping Class Actions
Beyond favoring federal court rules for handling class actions,
Congress could determine that expanding federal court jurisdiction is
justified in order to safeguard the ability of federal courts to manage
the class actions before them. This ability could be undermined if
state courts entertain class actions that overlap with those pending in
federal court. For cases in federal court, the risk of such an occur-
rence is virtually nil, since the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion will transfer the case to avoid the risk of conflicting class-
171 1d.
172 See S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 1453(b)(2) (2003) (providing a right to remove "by
any plaintiff class member who is not a named or representative class member without
the consent of all members of such class").
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certification rulings. 11 The problem, then, is essentially limited to
competing state court class actions; as soon as these can be moved into
federal court, however, the mechanism exists to solve the problem.
For a federal court trying to manage a class action, the disruption
that a competing state court class action can cause is considerable. In
some cases, plaintiffs have managed to persuade state court judges to
enter orders that seem designed to puncture the federal judges' ef-
forts.
7 4 In other cases, parties to a class action settlement that a fed-
eral court had found unfair appear capable, despite that disapproval,
of persuading a state court judge to approve essentially the same set-
tlement.' And a federal judge's ruling that a case cannot satisfy fed-
eral class-certification standards may be nullified by a later state court
ruling certifying a similar or identical class, what one might call "drive-
by again" certification. 
76
173 See, e.g., In re High Sulfur Content Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 2d
755, 757 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (placing particular emphasis on "prevent[ing] inconsistent
pretrial rulings, especially with respect to class certification," in deciding whether to
transfer for purposes of consolidation); DAviD F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
MANUAL § 5.24 (2007) (asserting that "if there are conflicting or potentially conflicting
class claims in the litigation, transfer is likely regardless of the presence or absence of
other factors that would otherwise favor or militate against transfer").
174 For an example, see Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir.
1993), in which the Third Circuit reviewed a West Virginia state court order purport-
ing to opt all West Virginia residents out of a class action that was in settlement review
in federal court. Not only did this order threaten to undermine the federal court's
settlement-review process, but it also would have prevented any West Virginia class
members who wanted to participate in the class settlement from doing so. Id. at 203.
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's injunction against the state court order.
Id. at 204.
175 For an example, see In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products
Liability Litigation, 134 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1998), in which, after a proposed settle-
ment was rejected in federal court, the parties "repaired to the l8thJudicial District for
the Parish of Iberville, Louisiana, where a similar suit had been pending, restructured
their deal, and submitted it to the Louisiana court, which ultimately approved it" as a
national class action settlement. The Third Circuit held that, because by then there
was no class settlement pending before the federal court, there was nojustification for
a federal injunction against the proceedings in state court. Id. at 145.
176 The most famous illustration involves an aggressive use of federal injunctive
power to prevent such "second chance" certification. In In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
Tires Products Liability Litigation, 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit
directed that all members of the proposed class be enjoined from seeking nationwide
class certification in another court after it had ruled that nationwide certification was
improper. Although the decision could be challenged in regards to the power of a
federal court to enjoin state court litigation, Judge Easterbrook's opinion emphasizes
the disruptive potential of parallel class-certification efforts:
Relitigation can turn even an unlikely outcome into reality. Suppose that
every state in the nation would as a matter of first principles deem inappropri-
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Outside the context of class action litigation, the presumption is
that parallel litigation generally will be allowed to proceed, particu-
larly if it is proceeding in both state and federal court. 177 But the class
action places great stress on this complacent attitude:
The background rule of parallel litigation does not cope well with the
inherently interstate nature of large-scale class action cases. Conflicts
and overlaps among jurisdictions, which are relatively uncommon in tra-
ditional litigation, become normal and expected. The large-scale class
action pushes the system away from the parallel litigation model and to-
ward the exclusive forum model. Over time, this evolutionary process
can be expected to continue, either by way of judicially crafted rules or• . 178
through federal or state legislation.
Alerted to these problems, the Advisory Committee began to study
them in the late 1990s. The initial indication was that the problem
with overlapping state-federal class actions was serious. "T, Along with
methods for improving the handling of class actions in federal court,
therefore, the Advisory Committee also explored ways to deal with the
difficulties of parallel proceedings. Initially Professor Cooper, Re-
porter to the Committee, devised some extremely aggressive legislative
ate a nationwide class covering these claims and products. What this might
mean in practice is something like "9 of 10 judges in every state would rule
against certifying a nationwide class". Although the 10% that see things
otherwise are a distinct minority, one is bound to turn up if plaintiffs file
enough suits-and, if one nationwide class is certified, then all the no-
certification decisions fade into insignificance. A single positive trumps all the
negatives.
Id. at 766-67. For a case that reached the opposite conclusion, see Bailey v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 414 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005). There, the Tenth Circuit held that
a federal court's refusal to enjoin efforts by other plaintiffs to obtain class certification
for a class that the federal court had refused to certify did not require issuance of an
injunction preventing their repeat tries. The Court focused particularly on the fact
that the defendant approached the federal court only after litigating class certification
in state court and that the district judge "acted out of respect for the work already per-
formed by the state court." Id. at 1190.
177 See generally RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 164-209 (4th ed. 2004) (pre-
senting and discussing cases that have confronted the issue of dual federal-state pro-
ceedings).
178 Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 517 (1996).
179 See Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes 23 (Oct. 6-7, 1997), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cvlo-97.htm (reporting that the data from
the Federal judicial Center showed at least one overlapping action in twenty to forty
percent of the federal court class actions it had studied); see also Rhonda Wasserman,
Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2000) (discussing the problems caused by
overlapping class actions).
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methods to achieve final "nonbankruptcy closure" in mass tort situa-
tions.80 Thereafter, at the same time its proposed amendments to
Rule 23 were published for public comment, the Committee also cir-
culated for discussion possible rule amendments to deal with overlap-
ping class actions. The amendments would limit the ability of another
court to certify a class once a federal court had denied certification,
and would also prevent a state court from approving a settlement once
a federal court had found a settlement inadequate. These possibilities
were explored carefully during a major conference that the Commit-
tee held in the fall of 2001, and serious questions were raised about
whether the Committee's rulemaking authority extended to such
measures. 1 1 Eventually, the Committee decided not to pursue a rule-
based solution.
Instead, it turned its attention to the possibility of suggesting that
Congress use minimal diversity jurisdiction as a method of solving
these problems. It made this suggestion during the period when
CAFA was being considered. The Judicial Conference had previously
opposed CAFA on the ground that it would add to caseload pressures
on the federal courts. These were legitimate concerns: if the propo-
nents of the legislation were correct that some state courts became
magnets for "universal venue" suits, it would be likely that federal
courts in those areas would face a particularly pronounced impact. In
fact, the post-CAFA increases in federal court class action filings have
not been distributed evenly. 8 2 But it could be argued that this use of
federal jurisdiction was preferable to disrupting federal jurisdiction of
class actions already in federal court, and for that reason the Advisory
Committee urged the Conference to modify its position."" Eventu-
18"4ally, the Judicial Conference did agree to do so.
180 See generally Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1943 (2000) (detailing what Cooper labeled the "All-Encompassing Model"
and the Rule 23 model and describing the challenges they present). For my evaluation
of those proposals, see Richard L. Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
2009 (2000).
181 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes 45-50 (Oct. 22-23, 2001), available at
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC100I .pdf.
182 See Emery G. Lee Ill & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness
Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1723, 1759 & fig.6 (2008) (displaying the varyiance in filing activity before and after
CAFA in the different circuits).
183 See Memorandum from David F. Levi, U.S. Dist. Judge, to the Civil Rules Advi-
sory Comm. 17 (May 7, 2002) (on file with author), which concluded
For these reasons the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure respectfully recommends to the Standing Committee on the Rules of
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Although one point made by the Advisory Committee was that na-
tional class actions appropriately should be heard in federal court,185
the initial prompt for its involvement was the disruption faced by fed-
eral courts trying to handle the class actions already before them, due
to parallel state court class actions. Particularly when coupled with
the reasonable preference that Congress could have had that such
class actions be heard by the federal courts, I1 6 this factor supports
Congress's decision to utilize minimal diversity jurisdiction to ensure
that appropriate class actions could get into federal court. The fact
that CAFA grants jurisdiction that goes farther than is necessary to ac-
complish this goal does not undermine the legitimacy of the goal it-
self. Similarly, the fact that it does not explicitly expand the authority
of federal courts to enjoin parallel state court class actions does not
mean that it does no work in avoiding the sort of disruption federal
courts have confronted in the past.i17
Practice and Procedure and to the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction
that they support the concept of minimal diversity for large, multistate class
actions, in which the interests of no one state are paramount, with appropriate
limitations or threshold requirements so that the federal courts are not un-
duly burdened and the states' jurisdiction over in-state class actions is left un-
disturbed.
184 See Lee & Willging, supra note 182, at 1730 (reporting that in March of 2003,
the Judicial Conference shifted course and adopted a resolution endorsing the prem-
ise that minimal diversity jurisdiction could be appropriate for federal court jurisdic-
tion over multistate class actions).
185 See infra Part 1V.B for a discussion of this rationale for CAFA. I am not con-
tending that this objective must be viewed as "procedural" in the sense that, by itself, it
would serve as a ground for rulemaking, but it certainly was a relevant point to make to
Congress about legislation that would also have the advantage of solving a procedural
problem.
186 See supra Part IV.A.1 (noting that ensuring the application of federal class ac-
tion procedures could be a rational goal for Congress to have).
187 For arguments that CAFA significantly broadened the authority of federal
courts to enjoin class action proceedings in state court, see Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 2035, pt. 1 (2008). Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda argue that CAFA should
also limit the ability of class members to challenge the binding effect of federal court
class action judgments. This would provide another potential way to insulate federal
class action proceedings from disruption due to collateral litigation (in either state or
federal court). See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under
Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1659 (2008).
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B. Providing the National Courts with Jurisdiction
To Hear National Class Actions
After spending considerable energy contemplating the "proce-
dural" reasons that generally justify Congress's use of diversity jurisdic-
tion in as it did in CAFA, I will spend much less time on the topic that
occupied more of the legislative debate-the desirability of opening
the national courts to cases of national importance. It is obvious to
the point of being a truism that Congress could more easily justify us-
ing federal court jurisdiction for the cases covered by CAFA than for
ordinary auto-accident litigation between citizens of different states.
Indeed, the continued general availability of diversity jurisdiction for
such commonplace cases certainly is a result of the lobbying power of
lawyers more than the existence of some overarching jurisdictional
policy under which access to the national tribunals should be pro-
moted. 1 This point was made, among others, by the Federal Courts
Study Committee in 1990 when it recommended (over the objections
of two practicing lawyers on the committee) that general diversity ju-
risdiction be eliminated. 19 At the very same time, that Committee af-
firmatively recommended something like CAFA, suggesting that Con-
gress create "a special federal diversity jurisdiction, based on the
minimal diversity authority conferred by Article III, to make possible
the consolidation of major multiparty, multiforum litigation.""9
Although attention had not yet focused on the potentially fear-
some effects of nationwide classes certified by state courts, the germ of
the CAFA jurisdictional idea was there. When one adds the possibility
of overreaching by state courts applying their own law to a nationwide
class, the case for considering federal court jurisdiction becomes very
clear. Professor Silberman once rhetorically asked about choice of
law issues in individual litigation, "Can the State of Minnesota Bind
the Nation?" 9 ' We now can see that by using a state court class action,
Minnesota could indeed.'9 2 Given that this powerful mechanism can
188 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 1, at 153 & n.54 (finding that the traditional
justifications for diversity jurisdiction are no longer present and positing that its en-
durance is due largely to lawyers' efforts to retain it).
189 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIT-
TEE 38-44 (1990).
190 Id. at 44.
191 Linda Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-
Law Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103 (1981).
192 For an example of a case in which one might make such an argument, see
Mooney v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America, 244 F.R.D. 531, 534-35 (D. Minn.
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be deployed in almost any county in the country, and that there is at
least some reason to suspect that some lawyers are seeking out local
state court judges from whom they can get remarkable accommoda-
tions, it is easy to understand why one would consider expanding fed-
eral court jurisdiction to offer an alternative forum. Even the most
vehement critics of CAFA concede that at least some of the examples
its proponents paraded were embarrassments.'93
Congress clearly intended to provide a federal forum for such
multistate litigation. 19 4 One objection that has been raised to this ini-
tiative is that it insults the state courts' ability to handle important liti-
gation themselves. On one level, that is clearly true; the legislative his-
tory is full of slights of state court judges that cannot be fully justified.
Judges that embody the bad characteristics offered to rationalize
CAFA are not numerous, even if some plaintiffs' lawyers try very hard
to get their cases before those judges. Moreover, many states have
made efforts to upgrade their handling of class actions to ensure that
such misadventures will not happen.
But these palliatives are hardly binding on Congress when it de-
termines what jurisdictional policy to pursue. At base, the mere exis-
tence of diversity jurisdiction could be said itself to represent a criti-
cism of state courts; justifying diversity jurisdiction on the basis of
concerns about bias against outsiders implicitly criticizes state courts
and regards federal courts as superior. Is the continued existence of
general diversity jurisdiction dependent upon a showing that state
court bias against outsiders is still widespread? One could argue that
the frequency of overreaching state court class actions is small, but so
also is the frequency of local bias against out-of-state litigants. As sug-
gested above, preference for federal procedures in state law cases is'99
proper. A preference for federal forums to go with those proce-
dures, at least for those cases that Congress deems of special national
2007), which holds that the defendant's Minnesota contacts were sufficient to permit
application of Minnesota law to the claims of non-Minnesota class members in a con-
sumer fraud suit.
193 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 121, at 1294 (recognizing that under Avery v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005), "[t]he application of the
uniquely restrictive Illinois law to the whole country ... illustrate[s] the potentially
abusive power one remote county court could exercise").
194 See CAFA § 2(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005) (stating that one
purpose of the legislation was to "restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of na-
tional importance under diversityjurisdiction").
195 Supra Part IV.A. 1.
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concern, is also proper. Further, the argument that national concern
about outsider bias in automobile tort cases somehow outstrips con-
cern about local bias against national corporations in class actions
strategically filed in remote counties is unpersuasive, or, at most, an
argument for Congress to weigh.
Moreover, even though state courtjudges are understandably sen-
sitive about slighting comparisons between themselves and federal
judges, the criteria for federal jurisdiction are, by their own terms, de-
signed to limit federal judges to the more important state law cases.
The amount-in-controversy minimum represents an explicit prefer-
ence for offering a federal forum only to more important cases, and
thus is an implicit slight to state courts. Certainly one could debate
whether dollars are the correct measure of a case's importance; the
abolition of the jurisdictional minimum for federal question cases a
generation ago in part reflected a judgment that, at least for those
cases, money is not an appropriate measure of the federal interest at
stake. Whether or not it is the best measure, however, it is the meas-
ure used for diversity cases. As we have seen, that measure does not
work well in class actions when applied to individual class members'
claims; CAFA, therefore, substitutes a class-wide measure that looks to
whether $5 million is sought in aggregate. 196 To claim that this is not
a reasonable threshold when the amount-in-controversy requirement
for most diversity cases is $75,000 is difficult indeed.
There seems, then, to be no strong criticism of the general juris-
dictional policy of CAFA to open the federal courts to genuinely
multistate class actions. But CAFA's calibration of the newjurisdiction
can certainly be challenged. As noted above, the contention that
CAFA would funnel all class actions into federal court has not proven
true. 197 But the exceptions to the new jurisdictional requirements are
both extremely hard to apply "" and very narrow. A strong argument
can be made that much broader exceptions would more effectively
ensure that only class actions of genuinely multistate character and
national interest would be in federal court under CAFA.
That argument for broader exemptions is weakened, however, by
the parallel justifications for favoring federal court jurisdiction: to en-
196 CAFA § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) (Supp. V 2005).
197 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (explaining research from California
class action filings supporting this point).
198 See supra Part III (discussing the many difficult determinations that must be
made in order to apply CAFA).
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sure the application of the recently improved federal procedural ap-
paratus for class actions and to avoid the potential disruption of pend-
ing federal court class actions by competing state court 
class actions. ' )
Moreover, there was considerable reason to believe that plaintiffs' law-
yers would strive mightily to avoid federal court and would exploit any
opportunity to do so if they could configure their cases to evade the
newly created jurisdiction.0 0  In light of that concern, it may have
been justified as a matter of jurisdictional policy to define the excep-
tions to federal court jurisdiction very narrowly so as to ensure that
the new jurisdiction reaches all cases that are truly multistate. Over-
breadth, then, could be a result of the desire to guarantee that lawyers
cannot evade the new jurisdiction in any case for which Congress
sought to afford a federal forum. Moreover, the statute has a safety
valve. It gives the district judge authority to decline to exercise the
new jurisdiction in a number of instances when it initially does apply,
and the considerations include a focus on whether there was an effort
to evade federal court jurisdiction. I" Thus, although strong argu-
ments have justifiably been made that the exceptions to the new juris-
diction are too narrow, given that judges may decline to exercise that
jurisdiction in any case in which fewer than two-thirds of the class
members are from the forum state, it is hardly irrational to adopt such
provisions as an antidote to aggressive efforts by plaintiffs' lawyers to
avoid federal court.
A different, and similarly telling, criticism of the decision by Con-
gress to pursue this jurisdictional policy is that the law's empirical
foundations are built on sand. Focusing on a select set of state court
jurisdictions, proponents of the legislation built a case based on the
fact that in at least one Illinois county there had been a rapid and
huge increase in the number of class actions, many filed by the same
199 See supra Part IV.A (supporting the legitimacy of Congress's desire to apply
what it views as superior federal class action rules).
,W The poster child among witnesses before Congress on this point was Hilda
Bankston, who testified about how her late husband-a Mississippi pharmacist-was
named as a defendant in a large number of pharmaceutical products liability suits to
defeat diversity and prevent removal to federal court. See Healing, supra note 162, at
34-36 (testimony of Hilda Bankston, former small business owner).
201 CAFA § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). Among the statutory considerations
relevant to the decision of whether to exercise the new jurisdiction is "whether the
class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction."
§ 1332 (d) (3) (C).
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202lawyers and having no obvious connection to the county. But a
more general survey done by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) found
that although plaintiffs' lawyers believed that federal judges would be
more favorable to defendants with respect to both class certification
and substantive issues when they filed in state court and defendants
removed (and defense lawyers believed the same), neither set of be-
liefs could be supported by the outcomes in the actual cases. 203 To the
contrary, there was no measurable difference between class-
certification decisions or settlement-approval decisions between state
204
and federal courts.
Of course, Congress is free to disregard such evidence if it chooses
to do so. For example, when Congress was considering the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act in 1990, it had before it an important and detailed
RAND Corporation study showing that there had been no actual in-
crease in delays in civil litigation in federal district courts,2 0 but it
went ahead and adopted the legislation anyway. In any case, the gen-
eral class action results found by the FJC do not prove that the percep-
tions of counsel are wrong, or wrong enough to count against the leg-
islation. For one thing, the methods available to even the FJC
Research investigators may not be sensitive enough to detect all that
matters to counsel and to Congress. For another, the possibility that a
few "bad apple" counties were the main focus of the legislation could
make the overall nationwide results less important to legislators.
V. TOWARDS THE SLIPPERY SLOPE? IMPLICATIONS
FOR ERIE AND KLAXON
206Besides ensuring that federal court procedure will be used, that
federal court handling of class actions will not be disrupted by parallel
207state court class actions, and that these nationally important cases
202 SeeJohn H. Beisner &Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case Out of
It... in State Court, 25 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 160 (2001) (reporting a 1850% rise
in class filings over three years in Madison County, Illinois, from two to thirty-nine).
203 THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN EM-
PIRIcAL EXAMINATION OF ATroRNEYs' CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
34-36 (2005), available at http://iv.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CActO5.pdf/
$file/ClActO5.pdf.
204 Id. at 34-41.
205 TERRENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND CORP. & INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 17-25
(1990).
206 Supra Part IV.A. 1.
207 Supra Part IV.A.2.
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can make their way to federal court,08 another jurisdictional policy
that CAFA might serve is to enable the federal courts to develop an
appropriate body of substantive law for class actions. Doing so might
advance the use of class actions, which CAFA arguably supports.2 09
Recently, in a series of articles, Professor Issacharoff has offered a de-
tailed and creative vision of an empowered federal judiciary respond-
ing to the need for nationally uniform standards by adopting such
substantive law on the basis of CAFA and a general need for such judi-
cial creativity. 20 But if that was not the goal of the legislation, it may
be viewed as a slippery slope enabled by expanded jurisdiction.
Frankly, this is a slippery slope toward which federal judges have
tended for some time. Over a dozen years ago, I explored the ways
that mass tort class action settlements tempted federal judges into dis-
regarding or overriding Erie in order to effect a sort of tort reform.2 '
Thesejudges were understandably perturbed by the prospects that (a)
varying state laws might produce hugely different results for tort
claimants of various states, even though the activity that was alleged to
have caused the injuries was nationwide, and (b) punitive damages re-
coveries in early cases might so deplete available assets that later
212claimants would be left with no prospect of meaningful recovery.
More recently, Professor Nagareda has made a similar point by em-
phasizing the "preexistence principle" that should constrain class ac-
tions; namely, that preexisting substantive rights should not be under-
213cut by the class action device. - At their heart, these arguments stress
the limits of the power conferred by Rule 23 to modify substantive le-
gal rules derived from state law either to facilitate class certification or
to accomplish the sorts of objectives we associate with tort reform.
One surely could, to some extent, use federal court jurisdiction as
a method for achieving such objectives. That sort ofjudicial activity-
common law lawmaking-appears at the heart of the judicial function
208 Supra Part W.B.
200) Supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
210 Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law
After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006) [hereinafter Issa-
charoff, Settled Expectations]; Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 15; Samuel Issacharoff,
Getting Beyond Kansas, 74 UMKC L. REv. 613 (2006) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Beyond
Kansas].
211 Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 858 (1995).
212 Id. at 859-66.
213 Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 156-57 (2003).
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as conceived in the eighteenth century. Indeed, one strand of ar-
gument in favor of diversity jurisdiction is that it was intended as a
protection against potentially aberrant state law. 2'15 But the reality is
that Congress disavowed that attitude from the outset and instead
adopted the Rules of Decision Act. 2 6 Despite that Act, for a consider-
able period the regime symbolized by Swift v. Tyson ' 7 prevailed, per-
haps because it accorded with the notion that the judicial function
normally included such lawmaking authority."s Erie changed all of that
and, moreover, held that its decision was constitutionally compelled.2 9
214 Compare Arthur John Keeffe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494, 497
(1949), who makes such an assertion in the twentieth century:
Unquestionably Article III of the Constitution designates the federal courts as
proper forums to litigate suits between "Citizens of different States." Givenju-
risdiction, it would logically follow that a federal court would have the consti-
tutional power to determine the controversy by any reasonable method. The
choice of "federal common law" rather than the law of a particular state is
clearly not so unreasonable as to be unconstitutional.
215 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positiv-
ism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 81 (1993) (arguing
that "the drafting and ratification history [of the Constitution] supports the conclusion
that diversity was intended at least in part as a protection against aberrational state
laws, particularly those regarding commercial transactions").
216 The Rules of Decision Act was section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 73, 92. It is now codified, and has been since 1948 (slightly amended), in 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2000): "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the -United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States in cases
where they apply."
27 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
218 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (1984).
Then-Professor Fletcher observed that in the mid-nineteenth century the general
common law was a reasonable place to look for guidance on issues not resolved by
"local" law:
In such cases, depending on the nature of the dispute, a number of different
kinds of law could provide the relevant rules of decision. The general com-
mon law was by far the most important of these nonlocal and nonfederal laws.
That ii was not explicitly referred to in section 34 does not prove that it was
not expected to be applied. Rather, the fact that it was not mentioned proba-
bly suggests quite the opposite-that its applicability was so obvious as to go
without saying.
Id. at 1517.
219 See Eie, 304 U.S. at 77-78 (stating that the Court would not have overturned "a
doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century" were it not for "the unconsti-
tutionality of the course pursued").
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For some, this was not an entirely happy change, and for them
CAFA may offer hope of undoing it. That seems to be Professor Issa-
charoff's goal. His starting point is the view that Erie no longer works
in today's interconnected world. 2 20 There is much to be said for the
notion that globalization and related developments have effected pro--• 22!
found changes, both legal and otherwise, but Erie was decided at a
time when the primacy of state regulation itself was in eclipse under
the force of the New Deal. This had the ironic result that many legal
topics formerly controlled by state law were increasingly subject to
federal legislation (often with the actual regulation being delegated to
administrative agencies). This, then, is a phenomenon that is almost
as old as Erie itself, but that does not mean these evolving forces read-
ily loosen Erie's bonds. Indeed, it seems to mean that the federal
courts, unlike other branches of the national government, are still sub-
ject to lawmaking constraint.222 Drawing on many sources, Professor
Issacharoff would discard those constraints on the federal judiciary.
Sometimes a grant of jurisdiction carries with it the implied grant
of such lawmaking power. The leading example is the Labor-
Management Relations Act (LMRA), which granted the federal courts
223jurisdiction over suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
Stressing the need for national uniformity in enforcement of such
agreements, the Supreme Court found that "the legislation does more
than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts," 224 and that it also au-
thorized the federal courts to develop federal rules of contract inter-
220 In advocating such a view, Professor Issacharoff has said that
Erie assumed a world in which controversies arose within a state and faithful
application of a state's laws could reasonably settle the expectations of all con-
cerned persons. But in a society in which people, goods, and services cross
state lines with abandon, the premise of Erie seems a fleeting memory.
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations, supra note 210, at 1871; see alsoJudith Resnik, Lessons in
Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: "The Po-
litical Safeguards" of Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1929, 1947 (2008) (asserting
that Erie was wrongly decided).
221 Cf Richard Marcus, Essay, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolu-
tion or Revolution?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (assessing the impact of
computers on many aspects of lawyers' work, and questioning whether it constitutes an
"evolution" or a "revolution" for the practice of law).
222 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CI. L.
REv. 1, 14-15 (1985) (explaining that the limits imposed by federalism on the exercise
of federal power were transformed, in an era of active legislation and executive branch
activity, into a constraint only on the judiciary).
223 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
224 Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
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• 225
pretaton. The Court has reached a similar conclusion with regard
226to ERISA. These situations would seem to be the most plausible
models for treating CAFA as justifying similar action by the federal
courts in handling class actions.
But the analogy to the LMRA or ERISA does not hold. For the
LMRA, Congress was creating jurisdiction to deal with a particular
species of legal problem, indeed one that had been the focus of much
federal legislation. The legislative history of ERISA expressly stated
that actions brought within the new federal court jurisdiction were to
be regarded as "arising under federal law" in the same manner as
those brought under the LMRA. 2 7 CAFA is quite different; there are
no subject-matter limits on types of cases that fall within the jurisdic-
tion it confers. Treating it as authorizing the creation of federal
common law to deal with certain topics, therefore, is much more diffi-
cult. Moreover, unlike the LMRA and ERISA, CAFA explicitly invokes
diversity jurisdiction. A central problem under the LMRA was that,
owing to the way labor unions were treated for purposes of diversity of
citizenship, 22 diversity jurisdiction would not work as a vehicle to
bring collective bargaining agreement suits into federal court. Thus,
jurisdiction had to be justified on the ground that the judge-made
rules whose creation it authorized would themselves serve as a basis
for federal question jurisdiction. As all recognize,2 9 Congress went to
some pains not to undertake any such delegation of lawmaking power
225 See id. at 456 (announcing that "the substantive law to apply in suits under
§ 301 (a) [of the LMRA] is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy
of our national labor laws").
226 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987) (explaining that "the
language of the jurisdictional subsection of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
closely parallels that of § 301 of the LMRA").
227 This proposition is found in H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 5107 (1974) (Conf.
Rep.), which states,
All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under
the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. The U.S. district courts
are to have jurisdiction of these actions without regard to the amount in con-
troversy and without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
228 See supra text accompanying note 55 (regarding citizenship of a labor union for
diversity purposes). Of course, Congress could direct that unions should be treated
somehow like corporations, but, even then, some suits to enforce collective bargaining
agreements would probably not satisfy complete diversity. As a result, federal question
jurisdiction seemingly was the only way to get all such cases into federal court.
229 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 8, at 1943 n.129 (citing CAFA's legislative history);
Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 15, at 1419 ("CAFA declared its intent to leave Erie
untouched ... ").
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in CAFA. Were the analogy apt, CAFA would displace state law on the
topic for actions in both state and federal court, and perhaps preclude
state courts from even entertaining actions within the compass of the
federal act.
Moreover, the argument that CAFA implicitly displaces Erie-
while saying that it does not do so-seems both too broad and too
narrow. It is too broad because the great breadth of CAFA jurisdic-
tion includes many cases for which a national substantive rule is not
needed. Consider, for example, the difficulties that proponents of
remand have encountered in showing that the requisite proportion of
a class is local, even in cases involving such clearly local matters as
hospital treatment or land contamination.230  Is CAFA designed to
empower the federal courts to develop a "national" body of law for
such cases? If it were, the authority CAFA would confer on federal
courts to develop national law would verge on (and perhaps exceed)
the scope of Congress's lawmaking power under the Commerce
Clause. At the same time, the argument for overriding Erie is also too
narrow because CAFA focuses only on class actions.23' If there is such
a need for national law to deal with claims about nationwide commer-
cial activities, it is hard to understand why that lawmaking is important
only in class actions. Is General Motors sufficiently protected in its na-
tionwide distribution of products when federal courts can develop
product liability laws for class actions against it? Does it not need simi-
lar protection for individual suits?
If Erie does not yield to CAFA, maybe Klaxon23 2 should. Professor
Hart deplored Klaxon almost from the outset.233 At least in class ac-
tions, choosing and applying a single national law would simplify the
230 See supra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
231 Indeed, as noted below, infra note 251, Judge Weinstein has recommended
that CAFA be amended to cover some individual actions.
232 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
233 For Professor Hart's views on the subject, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513-14 (1954):
[T]he Court [in Klaxon] has paralyzed the capacities of the federal courts to
further one of the central desiderata of a federal system. Uniformity of formal
doctrine throughout the ... states is occasionally desirable, and where that is
so a uniform federal substantive law provides the best means of securing it.
But uniformity of obligation as between particular individuals, regardless of
the locus of litigation, is almost invariably desirable; and the essence of this
can be achieved without enacting uniform substantive laws. The promotion of
this kind of uniformity, so far as this can be done without sacrifice of greater
values, is one of the functions of the principles of the conflict of laws.
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handling of the case by avoiding the management difficulties that flow
from trying to apply the law of different states to sectors of the class.
In that sense, relaxing Klaxon for cases covered by CAFA might do al-
most as much for unleashing such class actions as displacing Erie,
234
thus launching the federal courts down the slippery slope toward
which they have been tending.
One reaction is that state choice of law doctrine might suffice to
accomplish an objective seemingly sought by some federal judges in
class actions: having the same law apply to all claims. It hardly needs
to be emphasized now that having different legal rules apply to sectors
of the class constitutes an obstacle to class certification. Judge Easter-
brook went so far as to assert that "[n] o class action is proper unless
all litigants are governed by the same legal rules. '2 35 Without going to
that extreme, one might well expect that avoiding this difficulty could
loom over class action choice of law. And the obvious initial solution
is to apply the same law to all the claims. That, of course, was the re-
sult of the Kansas Supreme Court's decision below in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts2 6 to apply Kansas law to the claims of all the class mem-
bers. The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in that case that the due
process analysis must be done on a claimant-by-claimant basis does not
require a change in state choice of law doctrine, although it places a
constitutional constraint on it. Additionally, state choice of law doc-
trine could more vigorously or overtly pursue one prong of the Kansas
court's preference for applying its own law: making class actions
work. As Professor Woolley wrote before CAFA was adopted, state
choice of law rules for class actions should be respected by the federalr- 237
courts under Klaxon. In at least some cases covered by CAFA, that
would clearly seem justified. Consider, for example, the Eleventh Cir-
238cuit's case involving contaminated land in Alabama, or the Fifth Cir-
cuit's post-Katrina cases against hospitals. 39 Although former resi-
dents might claim application of another more favorable law in
234 See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the constraints on the
judicial power following Erie).
235 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. de-
nied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
236 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
237 Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits Cer-
tified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799, 801-09.
238 Supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
239 Supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
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individual litigation, it would surely be reasonable to apply forum
law to the claims of all in a class action.
Perhaps, however, it is improper to treat choice of law differently
in class actions from its treatment in individual suits. 24" But as Profes-
sor Burbank has noted, "states remain free to view class actions differ-
ently than they do individual actions. ' ,242 Here CAFA could play an
obstructive role by moving to federal court the very cases in which
such choice of law doctrine might develop. The problem is that there
is little indication that such specialized choice of law rules actually ex-
ist, unless the potentially overreaching preference for applying local
243law if at all possible actually embodies such a rule. That sort of rule
promotes forum shopping for the state with the law most favorable to
the class. Professor Burbank points out that this activity is one of the
things that CAFA was designed to curtail, which may mean that it
244should be barred by CAFA. Thus, there may be a ground for find-
ing in CAFA an implicit repeal of Klaxon in at least some situations.
240 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (upholding Minnesota's
application of Minnesota law to the claim of a former Wisconsin resident who moved
to Minnesota after the claim arose).
241 For an example of such an argument, see Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Com-
plex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (1996):
Because choice of law is part of the process of defining the parties' rights, it
should not change simply because, as a matter of administrative convenience
and efficiency, we have combined many claims in one proceeding; whatever
choice-of-law rules we use to define substantive rights should be the same for
ordinary and complex cases.
Note that this view seems to depend in part on an aggregation view of class actions. To
the extent that one takes an entity view of the class action, and perhaps also a represen-
tative view, see supra Part I1, the individualized choice of law inquiry looks less essential.
242 Burbank, supra note 8, at 1946; see also Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of
Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 2001, 2007 (2008) (recognizing that
states may adopt choice of law methodology that would facilitate class certification in
nationwide class actions, but agreeing with Professor Kramer, supra note 241, that
states should not do so).
243 But see Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After the Class Action
Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L. REV. 661, 672-76 (2006) (finding that some states have em-
braced such approaches to choice of law in class actions).
244 Professor Burbank argues that
[W] here state choice of law doctrine is materially influenced by state policy re-
flecting a bias in favor of aggregate litigation, CAFA's jurisdictional provi-
sions-reflecting (most charitably) a policy to enable aggregation decisions
unaffected by that bias-may plausibly be thought, in the words of the Rules
of Decision Act, to require otherwise than that such state law applies.
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Release from state choice of law provisions in cases covered by
CAFA would seemingly leave the federal courts free to develop alter-
native choice of law rules. One view might be that they should dis-
avow substitute rules that would facilitate class certification. That atti-
tude might be consistent with the goals of many proponents of the
legislation who largely sought to defeat class actions against them,24'
for promoting the application of a single state's law smacks of the sort
of overreaching that Congress sought to prevent. But if a federal
choice of law rule made a reasonable choice among possible states'
laws, that concern about overreaching could be satisfied. Moreover,
the emphasis on ensuring the application of the federal class action
provisions-including those governing settlement review and class
counsel appointment-might lead to flexibility on the choice of law
question that would facilitate class certification. If so, the existence in
federal court of a ground for immediate review of class-certification
decisions (seemingly including choice of law determinations integral
to those decisions) could be reassuring. And it might be that, in some
circumstances, promoting federal court class actions would also be an
effective way to deal with the problem of overlapping class actions by
making a single federal action more likely. Accordingly, in terms of
CAFA's jurisdictional policies, choice of law rules that were friendly to
class certification might sometimes be regarded as desirable. The
slippery slope toward using jurisdiction to supplant state choice of law
rules may thus beckon.
But the truly slippery slope has to do with the ordinary fate of class
actions: settlement. Settlement promotion is a huge and validly con-
troversial topic unto itself, but in class actions it takes on a new hue
246
and greater importance than in individual litigation. This impor-
tance results, of course, from the stakes involved, and the sensitivities
are heightened by the fact that one party and court-approved counsel
are acting on behalf of many others. In the settlement context, there
is considerable room to homogenize the legal rules to accommodate
the demands of class actions and settlement. That was the phenome-
Burbank, supra note 8, at 1950-51; see also Nagareda, supra note 243, at 683-84 (arguing
that federal courts' 'judicial methodology" after CAFA should resist overreaching state
choice of law doctrine in class actions).
245 Supra notes 8-9.
246 See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337 (1986) (exploring difficulties that result
when the same judge promotes a settlement in a class action and is then called upon to
decide whether the settlement is fair).
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non I was addressing a dozen years ago, 47 and seems to be the antici-
pation of Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey:
Although CAFA declared its intent to leave Erie untouched, once na-
tional-market cases are jurisdictionally isolated in federal courts, the
need to develop incremental decisional law to address the particular
concerns of these cases will be inescapable .... The likely effect of CAFA
will then be to allow a body of national law to develop that corresponds
to the demands of an undifferentiated market in which products are
manufactured and sent to consumers across a distributional chain of• . 248
ever-expanding geographic reach.
This attitude seems to embody what Judge Easterbrook called the
mindset of the "central planner., 249 At least some courts say that this
is their goal. In a leading case on review of a proposed settlement, for
example, the Third Circuit endorsed efforts to craft a nationwide
standard for resolving claims:'
It may be argued that problems national in scope deserve the attention
of national courts when there is appropriate federal jurisdiction. Be-
cause of the extraordinary number of claims, fairness counsels that
plaintiffs similarly injured by the same course of deceptive conduct
should receive similar results with respect to liability and damages.250
Others urge that CAFA should be expanded to permit removal of in-
dividual actions so they can be combined using multidistrict litigation
251procedures to facilitate nationwide settlements.
247 See Marcus, supra note 211, at 866-82 (describing how class actions were used to
break the lawmaking gridlock for mass tort situations and the Erie problem that this
presented).
248 Issacharoff& Sharkey, supra note 15, at 1419-20.
249 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
250 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir.
1998). This case is the only case cited in the Committee Notes to the 2003 amend-
ments to Rule 23(e) on settlement approval. See also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 236 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that "[ilt is in the nature of complex
litigation that the parties often seek complicated, comprehensive settlements to resolve
as many claims as possible in one proceeding").
Judge Weinstein made such a recommendation recently:
It may be useful for Congress to consider expanding the Class Action Fairness
Act from class actions to at least some national MDL, non-Rule 23, aggregate
actions. As use of the class action device to aggregate claims has become more
difficult, MDL consolidation has increased in importance as a means of
achieving final, global resolution of mass national disputes.
In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). For discussion of
the role in such nationwide settlements played by multidistrict transfer, see Richard
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There is a great deal to be said in favor of such an attitude; in-
deed, for many class members the advantages of such a settlement re-
gime might be preferable to insisting on their "right" to proceed in
individual suits under alternative legal rules. For this reason, genuine
consent to such a regime would seem to validate imposing it. 252 The
new emphasis on giving class members an opportunity to opt out after
the proposed terms of settlement are known seems a'step in this direc-
tion,253 and such an opportunity would seem to follow as a matter of
course should settlement and certification be proposed concurrently.
But the Supreme Court's Amchem decision 254 is a fly in the oint-
ment. The basic thrust of the decision was that-at least in the mass
tort context-Rule 23(e) is "an additional requirement, not a super-
seding direction., 255 So the judge's sense that the result is fair and de-
sirable is not enough; class-certification requirements apply with full
(or even heightened) force, except for a reduced emphasis on man-
ageability. In particular, the Court emphasized that, even though set-
tlement might obviate concerns about manageability, the predomi-
nance inquiry must be satisfied in the settlement context.5
6
Accordingly, the district court's emphasis in Amchem on the class
members' "interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation for
their claims" did not suffice to permit approval of class treatment, and• 257
therefore the proposed settlement regime. Many, including Justice
Breyer, are puzzled by concern about predominance in the settlement
context. 258 One function there is to alert the court to divergent inter-
ests that divide the class-one of those interests surely being divergence
Marcus, Cure-Alfor an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidis-
trict Litigation Panel's Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
252 See Marcus, supra note 211, at 905-06 (discussing the validation that could come
in some instances from allowing class members to opt out).
253 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (4) (providing that the court may decline to approve a
settlement unless class members are afforded a second opportunity to opt out even if
they already have passed up such an opportunity).
254 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
255 Id. at 621.
256 See id. at 622-23 ("The benefits... from the establishment of a grand-scale
compensation scheme is a matter fit for legislative consideration, but it is not pertinent
to the predominance inquiry." (citations omitted)).
257 Id. at 622.
258 See id. at 634 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
he does not "understand how one could decide whether common questions 'pre-
dominate' in the abstract-without looking at what is likely to be at issue in the pro-
ceedings that will ensue, namely, the settlement").
2008] ASSESSING CAFA 'S STA TED JURISDICTIONAL POLICY
• 259in otherwise pertinent state laws. So "fairness" via class action settle-
ments still jostles uneasily with the continuing relevance of Erie in the
settlement context.
In many instances, however, it would seem that workable alterna-
tives should exist. One such alternative would be some relatively sim-
ple subdivision of the class among a limited range of differing state• 260
law regimes. Yet if there is also a need to segment the class to deal
• 261
with other divergences, the additional complication of subdividing
further to cope with varying state law could often create complexities
that would swamp a nationwide settlement. If that is so, however, one
might well ask why it is so troublesome. At least a considerable num-
ber of states should be able to muster classes of sufficient magnitude
to warrant litigation on their behalf alone, and, if so, the choice of law
complication would seemingly be solved for those cases. That solu-
tion would offer cold comfort in situations that raise limited fund
262
concerns, but those cases are hardly the norm, even with nationwide
class settlements. For defendants who are not facing bankruptcy, the
prospect of state-by-state class actions may well be less attractive than a
nationwide settlement that puts the entire problem behind them.
And for class counsel who hope to justify a fee on the basis of a na-
tionwide class settlement, a statewide class may be considerably less in-
viting. But the notion that CAFA will entirely insulate defendants
against liability in small-claim class actions due to the choice of law
problem seems unjustified, and the impulse toward favoring nation-
wide classes in the face of important differences in otherwise applica-
ble state law is similarly less than compelling.
In sum, CAFA does create or perpetuate conditions that could fos-
ter slippery-slope tendencies toward a blanket preference for "na-
25 See id. at 610 n.14 (majority opinion) (noting that California plaintiffs in meso-
thelioma cases regularly recover more than twice the maximum amount obtainable
under the settlement in individual suits).
260 See Kramer, supra note 241, at 584 (proposing that problems be solved through
a state-by-state survey of state law and asserting that, "because variation in the legal
rules is not great, once the state-by-state survey is completed, judges will find a rela-
tively small number of conflicts and an equally small number of approaches to choice
of law").
261 In Amchem, for example, the Court stressed the divergent interests of those who
have not yet manifested serious illnesses, by which it seemingly meant that they should
be segregated into a different subclass from the class made up of those who were al-
ready ill. 521 U.S. at 602-04.
2 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 827-28 (1999) (presenting a
proposal to settle claims under Rule 23(b)(1) on the ground that defendant lacks suf-
ficient assets to pay all claims).
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tional solutions" in federal court, perhaps under what would in effect
emerge as federal "common law" for nationwide activities, even if de-
signed only for individual cases. But it need not do so, and it does not
depend on jurisdictional policies that favor this result.
CONCLUSION
263
Whether or not one regards procedure as power, it seems un-
deniable that jurisdiction most assuredly is power. Without it, judges
are powerless to make decisions binding on parties. Jurisdiction pol-
icy, then, is addressed to choices about exercising judicial power.
CAFA overtly seeks to empower federal judges to produce results dif-
ferent from those supposedly reached by some state courtjudges. No
doubt some proponents of the legislation hope that federal judges will
wield this new power in ways the proponents prefer.
This Article has explored somewhat different reasons for provid-
ing federal judges with additional jurisdiction in class actions-the
ones put forward in support of the legislation-and found them vi-
able. Favoring use of federal procedures for class actions makes264
sense, as does favoring expansion of federal court jurisdiction to
cure problems created by overlapping class actions. Admittedly, the
fact that defendants can escape federal court scrutiny of their class ac-
tion settlements by seeking state court approval and forgoing the ju-
risdiction CAFA authorizes (even after initially invoking it) erodes the
utility of the new jurisdiction, but this may still be preferable to alter-
native arrangements. Expanding jurisdiction to include multistate
class actions because they are of national import similarly seems rea-
sonable as jurisdictional policy,2 6 6 although the great breadth of
CAFA's jurisdictional grant can include cases that do not involve sig-
nificant multistate elements and require courts and parties to con-
front difficult and time-consuming issues to determine whether there
267
isjurisdiction.
Hence the bottom-line question of whether this shift of jurisdic-
tional power will prove wise will be hard to answer for some time.
Nonetheless, there is little reason to think that the former approach
263 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1471-76
(1987) (developing the theme of "procedure as an instrument of power").
264 Supra Part W.A. 1.
265 Supra Part IV.A.2.
26 Supra Part IV.B.
267 Supra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
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to federal court jurisdiction for class actions had advantages that we
are losing,' 68 and refining class action theory does not appear likely to
solve these jurisdictional problems, even if it offers a good approach
269
to other issues. It may be that one enduring consequence of CAFA
will be that federal courts-with expanded responsibility for class ac-
tions involving nationwide consequences of activity affecting many
states-will actually expand the importance of class action resolution
of such problems. Should they tend towards the slippery slope of fa-
cilitating combined treatment-either overtly by finding authority in
CAFA for developing national rules governing nationwide activity or
authority to select choice of law rules enabling nationwide class ac-
270
tions, or covertly by favoring nationwide class action settlements
over state-by-state class actions-that effect will be magnified. For the
present, then, the enduring effect of this once-in-a-career change in
class action practice 27 remains up for grabs, and for that reason the
consequences of adopting these jurisdictional policies also remain un-
certain.
268 Supra Part I.
26 Supra Part II.
270 Supra Part V.
271 Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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